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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
APPEAL AND ERROR
Andrews v. O'Hearn
In Andrews v. O'Hearn' Mary and Mark Andrews appealed
from a judgment dismissing their complaint, an order denying their
motion for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and an order denying costs in their favor and granting
taxation of costs against them.2 Following a nine week trial, a jury
found that three of the defendants were negligent but that their
negligence was not the proximate cause of Mary Andrews'
injuries. 3 Consequently, the jury awarded no damages. 4 The
Andrews raised several issues on appeal.
5
The Andrews argued that the trial court had erroneously
refused to consider jury affidavits to determine whether the jury
had disregarded the trial court's instruction on proximate cause
and had instead relied on their own definition of proximate cause. 6
The supreme court, however, stated that jury affidavits may not be
used to impeach a jury's verdict by attempting to demonstrate the
mental processes or reasoning used by the jurors to arrive at their
decision. 7 The court stated that the use ofjury affidavits to impeach
a verdict would create a substantial chilling effect upon jurors and
hinder their free and open discussion. 8 The court also noted that it
would result in "interminable controversy" after trials. 9 The court
concluded that jury affidavits may not be used to impeach the
jury's internal deliberations but may be used to show juror
misconduct based upon outside influences. 10  Therefore, the
supreme court concluded that the trial court properly refused to
consider the jury affidavits."1
The Andrews also argued that the bailiff's communication
1. 387 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1986).
2. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 718 (N.D. 1986).
3. Id. The complaint alleged medical malpractice against Drs. O'Hearn, Thompson,
Harrington, Shook, and Gilbertson, Fargo Clinic, St. Luke's Hospital, and The Neurologic
Associates and Radiologists, Ltd. Id. Thejury found that defendants O'Hearn, Harrington, and St.




7. Id. at 719; see Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 343 (N.D.
1984) (stating rule against impeaching a jury verdict); see also N.D.R. EvID. 606(b) (inquiring into
validity ofjury verdict); N.D.R. Civ. P. 59(b) (2) (causes for a new trial based onjury misconduct).
8. 387 N.W.2d at 720 (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915)).
9. 387 N.W.2d at 719 (quoting State v. Forrester, 14 N.D. 335, 338, 103 N.W. 625, 626
(1905)).
10. 387 N.W.2d at 722; see N.D.R. EvIn. 606(b) (stating when ajuror may impeach a verdict).
11. 387 N.W.2d at 722. The Andrews also argued that under the due process provision of the
North Dakota Constitution the jury affidavits should be considered. Id. at 723; see N.D. CONST. art.
I, S 9. Andrews argued that the due process provision guaranteed justice to individual litigants and
that the guarantee was unfilfilled because they were being "forced to suffer a clear miscarriage of
.justice." 387 N.W.2d at 723. The court, however, stated that the constitutional provision was a
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with the jury during its deliberations, without notice to and outside
the presence of counsel, constituted prejudicial error. 12 The jury
members had requested the bailiff to get them a dictionary.' 3 The
bailiff refused and told the jury that future requests should be
written down and given to the judge who would call the attorneys
together before responding to the request.' 4 The supreme court
determined that the bailiff's comments to the jury were improper.15
The court stated that, although a bailiff is allowed to communicate
with the jury regarding administrative matters, the bailiff may not
discuss the substantive law or procedural rules.16 The court applied
the harmless error doctrine to the bailiff's communication and
determined that the communication was harmless.17 The court
accordingly affirmed the judgment and orders. '8
Priel v. R.E.D., Inc.
In Priel v. R. E. D., Inc. 19 the supreme. court reversed a district
court's judgment entered on a jury verdict because of improper
argument of counsel. 20 On January 11, 1982, the plaintiff fell on an
accumulation of snow and ice on the sidewalk and parking lot of a
Burger King restaurant. 2' Her right leg was fractured as a result of
the fall. 22 On August 18, 1983, the plaintiff fell again and injured
her left hip.2 3 The plaintiff's doctor stated that the second fall was
caused by problems resulting from the first fall at Burger King.
24
The plaintiff sued Burger King for damages.
25
At trial Burger King's lawyer, in his closing argument, stated
guarantee of access to the judicial system and that it had never been construed aj an absolute
guarantee of justice. Id. The court noted that while it had, in the past, used the provision to correct
substantive errors, this was not an appropriate situation to invoke the provision. Id.
12. 387 N.W.2d at 723.
13. Id. at 724.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-14-18 (Supp. 1985) (restricting communication with jurors
during the course of jury deliberations).
17. 387 N.W.2d at 724-25.
18. Id. at 734. The Andrews also argued that the trial court's instruction on proximate cause
was improper because it referred to the concept of direct cause. Id. at 726. The court, looking at the
instruction in its entirety, stated that it was not confusing or misleading. Id. at 727. The court also
noted that, since the Andrews had failed to object to the instruction or raise the issue in their motion
for a new trial, their objection to the instruction must fail. Id. at 727-29.
19. 392 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 1986).
20. Priel v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65,66,68 (N.D. 1986).
21. Id. at 66-67.
22. Id. at 66.
23. Id. at 67.
24. Id.
25. Id. The plaintiff sued Burger King alleging both negligence and nuisance. Id. The trial
court, however, refused to submit instructions on the nuisance theory because of insufficient
evidence. Id. at 67, 69. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that this was not
error. Id. at 70.
1987]
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that any payments would have to come out of his client's own
pocket, implying that the defendant had no insurance. 26 The
plaintiff's objection to the statement was overruled. 27 The jury
found that Burger King had been negligent but that its negligence
was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 28 Judgment
was entered accordingly. 2
9
The issue on appeal concerned the propriety of the statement
implying that Burger King was uninsured.3 0 The North Dakota
Supreme Court discussed the long tradition of disallowing any
mention of insurance in a jury trial. 3' The court noted that
knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of insurance is
irrelevant to the question of negligence. 32 The court concluded that
the statement constituted prejudicial error and therefore reversed




In Benson v. Taralseth34 Richard Benson appealed from a
district court judgment which awarded title of certain parcels of
land to the defendants and created a $12,000 lien on land to which
Richard Benson was awarded title. 35 Richard Benson's predecessor
in interest, Ruby Benson, acquired a parcel of land in 1951.36 In
1956 Taralseth acquired land adjacent to Ruby Benson's
property. 37 When Taralseth surveyed, subdivided, and platted his
land in 1960, he mistakenly included lots 17-22 of Ruby Benson's
property in the plat. 38 Prior to 1972, Taralseth conveyed lots 17,
19, 20, 21, and 22 to the defendants.3 9 He conveyed lot 18 in
1980.40 The Bensons and the defendants both paid taxes on the
26. Id. at 67.
27. Id.
28. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the jury's findings of negligence, but not proximate
cause, were irreconcilable with the evidence presented. Id. at 69. The supreme court refused to
reverse the jury's findings, however, stating that negligence and proximate cause are generally
questions of fact. Id. (citingKnorrv. K-MartCorp., 300 N.W.2d 47, 51 (N.D. 1980)).
29. Id. at 67.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 67-68.
32. Id. (quoting Beardsley v. Ewing, 40 N.D. 373, 385, 168 N.W. 791, 794 (1918)).
33. Id. at 68.
34. 382 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1986).
35. Benson v. Taralseth, 382 N.W.2d 649, 652 (N.D. 1986).
36. Id. at 650. Benson acquired the land by deed dated July 3, 1978 and recorded September 7,
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property. 41 Richard Benson commenced a quiet title action in
1982.42 The district court awarded the defendants title to lots 17,
19, 20, 21, and 22 and awarded Richard Benson title to lot 18
subject to a $12,000 lien for improvements made.
43
Section 47-06-03 of the North-Dakota Century Code allows a
person to acquire title by adverse possession after 10 years if done
under color of title coupled with payment of taxes. 44 On appeal,
Richard Benson argued that the defendants had not satisfied the
statute because they had not paid all the taxes assessed against the
property since the defendants did not pay the taxes that the Bensons
had paid. 45 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the
number of times the land was assessed and the taxes paid was
immaterial. 46 Since the defendants had fully complied with section
47-06-03, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's order
quieting title in the defendants' names.4 7 The court also affirmed
the imposition of the $12,000 lien on lot 18.48 In doing so, the court
followed the rule that provides when improvements are made in the
belief that the improver was the true owner of the property, a
judgment may properly provide against unjust- enrichment to the




In Ranta v. McCarney ° McCarney appealed from a judgment
41. Id. Neither party was aware that the other party was also paying taxes. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 652.
44. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-06-03 (1978). Section 47-06-03 of the North Dakota Century
Code, in pertinent part, provides:
A title to real property, vested in any person who has been or hereafter shall be,
either alone or including those under whom he claims, in the actual open adverse and
undisputed possession of the land under such title for a period of ten years and who,
either alone or including those under whom he claims, shall have paid all taxes and
assessments legally levied thereon, shall be valid in law. Possession by a county under
tax deed shall not be deemed adverse. A contract for deed shall constitute color of title
within the meaning of this section from and after the execution of such contract.
Id.
45. 382 N.W.2d at 653.
46. Id. at 653-54 (citing Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 99 Cal. 672, 34 P. 509 (1893)). The court
recognized that the issue of whether double taxation and double payment satisfies an adverse
possession statute was one of first impression in North Dakota. Id. at 653.
47. Id. at 654; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-06-03 (1978). For the text of 5 47-06-03 of the North
Dakota Century Code, see supra note 44.
48. 382 N.W.2d at 655.
49. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-17-09 (1976) (compensation for improvements made under
color of title and in good faith).
50. 391 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1986).
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awarding Ranta fees for legal services, primarily involving tax
questions, which Ranta performed for McCarney. 51 The question
raised was one of first impression: whether an out-of-state attorney
not authorized to practice law in North Dakota may recover
compensation for services rendered. 52 The supreme court noted
that section 27-11-01 of the North Dakota Century Code requires
an attorney to be licensed in North Dakota before practicing law in
the state. 53 The court stated that, although the statute did not
specifically prohibit compensation of out-of-state attorneys, the
statute was intended to protect citizens from the unlicensed and
unauthorized practice of law. 54 therefore, the court held that an
out-of-state attorney who is not licensed in North Dakota, cannot
recover compensation for services rendered in North Dakota.
5 5
Justices Levine and Meschke dissented from the majority's
opinion.5 6 Justice Levine agreed with the majority's statement that
the purpose of section 27-11-01 is to protect the public from
unqualified attorneys. 57 However, because Ranta was a highly
qualified attorney, Justice Levine argued that the statute was
inapplicable. 58 Justice Meschke joined in Justice Levine's dissent,
and wrote separately to emphasize that today's multistate
relationships require flexible interpretation of section 27-11-01 of
the North Dakota Century Code.
59
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Brakke
In Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Brakke60 Charles Brakke appealed
from a default judgment in favor of Dakota Bank and Trust
Company (Dakota Bank). 61 Dakota Bank commenced an action
against Brakke for failure to pay on a promissory note and several
51. Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 162 (N.D. 1986). Ranta, a licensed Minnesota
attorney, provided legal services to McCarney in North Dakota. Id.
52. Id. at 163. The court determined that Ranta's conduct did constitute the practice of law. See
id. (citing Cain v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936)).
53. Id. at 162; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-11-01 (Supp. 1985) (prohibiting the practice of law in
North Dakota without proper authorization).
54. 391 N.W.2d at 163 (citing State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646 (N.D. 1986)).
55. Id. at 164. The court also determined that Ranta's violation of S 27-11-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code constituted unclean hands and precluded the application of equitable
principles. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CoE 5 27-11-01 (Supp. 1985) (prohibiting the unauthorized practice
of law in North Dakota).
56. 391 N.W.2d at 166 (LevineJ., dissenting); id. at 168 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 166 (LevineJ., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 168-69 (Meschke, J., dissenting) (citing In re Waring, 47 N.J. 367, 221 A.2d 193
(1966)); see N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-11-01 (Supp. 1985).
60. 377 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1985).
61. Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Brakke, 377 N.W.2d 553, 554 (N.D. 1985).
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guarantees. 62 Because of Brakke's refusal to answer the complaint
or comply with Dakota Bank's discovery requests, his attorney filed
a motion to withdraw as counsel. 63 Dakota Bank then filed a motion
to compel discovery and a hearing on both motions was
scheduled. 64  On the scheduled hearing day, Brakke filed a
"counterclaim" against Dakota Bank, Dakota Bank's attorneys,
and his former attorney, and an "Order for Summary Judgment"
granting himself summary judgment on his counterclaim. 65 He did
not respond to either motion or appear at the hearing. 66 After the
hearing, the district court determined that Brakke's documents
lacked "any merit whatsoever" and did not require a response.
67
The court also granted the attorney's motion to withdraw but did
not rule on Dakota Bank's motion to compel discovery. 68 The court
rescheduled a hearing on that motion to allow Brakke to obtain new
counsel. 69 Brakke did not appear at the rescheduled hearing and the
court, after finding Brakke's failure to respond to discovery
requests willful, ordered default judgment in favor of Dakota Bank
pursuant to rule 37 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 0
Brakke appealed, contending that the district court had abused its
discretion in imposing the discovery sanction of default. 7
1
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that, because Brakke
had failed to respond to Dakota Bank's discovery requests, the
district court was justified in imposing an immediate sanction.
72
The court recognized that the harsh sanction of a default judgment
was to be imposed sparingly and only in extreme situations.
73
However, the court stated that the district court had not acted
"arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably" and therefore
affirmed the default judgment.
7 4
62. Id. As security for loans to Brakke's son and daughter-in-law, Brakke had cosigned one note
and guaranteed others. Id.
63, Id. Brakke refused to answer interrogatories because he felt that they violated his privacy. Id.
Brakke's attorney filed Brakke's answer the day after she made a motion to withdraw as counsel. Id.
64. Id.




68. Id. at 555. Brakke proceeded pro se until oral argument before the North Dakota Supreme
Court. Id.
69. Id. Prior to the hearing, Dakota Bank filed a motion for summary judgment based on its
unanswered requests for admissions. Id.
70. Id.; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 37 (sanctions for failure to comply with discovery requests). In ad-
dition to granting default judgment, the court determined that Dakota Bank had met its burden of
proofon its motion for summary judgment. 377 N.W.2d at 555.
71. 377 N.W.2d at 555.
72. Id. at 556; see N.D.R. Ctv. P. 37 (sanctions for failure to comply with discovery requests).
73. 377 N.W.2d at 558.
74. Id. Justice Meschke, in a special concurrence, stated that he would have affirmed because
Dakota Bank was entitled to summary judgement. Id. at 559 (MeschkeJ., concurring specially).
19871
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Keyes v. Amundson
In Keyes v. Amundson 7  appellants appealed from an order
denying their motion for a new trial and an order denying their
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.7 6 The trial court
had entered judgment on the jury's verdict which awarded Keyes
damages for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident. 7
7
Appellants raised two issues: whether newly discovered evidence
constituted grounds for a new tria 7 8 and whether the appellants'
conformity with parking ordinances precluded a finding of
negligence as a matter of law. 79 The supreme court stated that a
trial court's denial of a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. 80  The court determined, however, that the newly
discovered evidence, an eye witness to the accident, created a
strong possibility of a different result. 8' Therefore, the court
concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying
the motion for a new trial. 82 The supreme court also stated that
compliance with an ordinance satisfies a minimum standard of care




Storsteen v. Cuypers (In re Cuypers)
In Storsteen v. Cuypers (In re Cuypers)84 Cuypers appealed from a
court order transferring him from outpatient treatment at South
Central Human Services to inpatient treatment at the state
75. 391 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1986).
76. Keyes v. Amundson, 391 N.W.2d 602, 603-04 (N.D. 1986).
77. Id. at 603. The case had previously been remanded for a new trial because of Jury
misconduct. Id. at 604; see Keyes v. Amundson, 343 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1983).
78. 391 N.W.2d at 604. After the trial, appellants discovered an eye witness to the accident and
made a motion for a new trial pursuant to rule 59 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.;
see N.D. R Civ. P. 59(b)(4) (causes for new trial).
79. 391 N.W.2d at 607. The appellants' truck was legally parked on a street near the
intersection where the accident occurred. Id. Appellants contended that since it was legally parked,
they were not negligent as a matter of law. Id.
80. Id. at 604. The court stated that there are five requirements that must be met before a new
trial will be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence: (1) the evidence must be discovered
after the trial; (2) the movant must have exercised due diligence in attempting to locate the evidence;
(3) the newly discovered evidence must not be cumulative or impeaching; (4) the newly discovered
evidence must be material and admissible; and (5) the newly discovered evidence must be such that a
new trial would probably produce a different.jury result. Id. at 605 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 606.
82. Id. at 607.
83. Id. (citing Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 104 Il1. App.
3d 257, 432 N.E.2d 920 (1982)).
84. 389 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1986).
[VOL. 63: 71
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hospital. 85 Cuypers had been involuntarily committed to the state
hospital in 1985.86 Cuypers was later released and ordered to
undergo outpatient treatment. 87 Because Cuypers failed to appear
for treatment, he was rehospitalized by court order. 88 Nine months
later, Cuypers was transferred to South Central Human Services
for outpatient treatment. 89 When he again failed to appear for
treatment, proceedings were instituted to transfer him back to the
state hospital. 90 Cuypers contended that, because he is entitled to
the least restrictive treatment consistent with his needs, the party
attempting the transfer must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that hospitalization is the least restrictive treatment before
the transfer can be made. 91
The supreme court concluded that a party attempting to
transfer a patient from outpatient treatment to inpatient treatment
at the state hospital must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that hospitalization is the least restrictive treatment. 92 The court
reasoned that this view was reasonable and consistent with the
legislative intent behind section 25-03.1-34 of the North Dakota
Century Code, which governs transfers to the state hospital. 93 The
court noted that the legislature had enacted section 25-03.1-34 to
safeguard an individual's rights in commitment proceedings.
94
Thus, the higher burden of proof was appropriate. 95 The court then
determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that
hospitalization was the least restrictive treatment consistent with
Cuyper's medical needs. 96 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
order transferring Cuypers from outpatient treatment to inpatient
treatment at the state hospital.
97
85. Storsteen v. Cuypers (In re Cuypers), 389 N.W.2d 812, 813 (N.D. 1986).
86. Id. Cuypers was found to be suffering from a mental disorder that substantially impaired his




90. Id. A hearing was held pursuant to § 25-03.1-34 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.; see
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-34 (Supp. 1985) (transfer of patients from hospital or agency).
91. 389 N.W.2d at 813; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 25-03.1-40(2) (1978) (rights of patients in a
treatment facility include right to least restrictive treatment).
92. 389 N.W.2d at 814.
93. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-34 (Supp. 1985). Section 25-03.1-34 does not address
the burden of proof required to effect a transfer. See id. However, clear and convincing evidence is
required to effect an involuntary commitment. Id. § 25-03.1-19,
94. 389 N.W.2d at 814. The court noted that an individual is entitled to the least restrictive
treatment, to treatment with dignity and respect, to freedom from unnecessary restraint, and to all
civil rights. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-40 (1978) (rights of patients in a treatment facility).
95. 389 N.W.2d at 814.
96. Id. Hospitalization was the least restrictive treatment prior to Cuyper's transfer to
outpatient treatment and the outpatient treatment was inadequate. Id.
97. Id.
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State v. Niska
In State v. Niska9a Niska appealed from a conviction for
practicing law without a license in violation of section 27-11-01 of
the North Dakota Century Code.99 Niska contended that section
27-11-01 was unconstitutional because it violated his right to
freedom of speech.100 The court noted that section 27-11-01 was not
enforced against Niska in order to silence his political views, but
rather, was enforced to prohibit him from the unauthorized
practice of law and resulted in only an incidental restriction on
speech. 01 The court determined that the incidental restriction was
valid.10 2 The court recognized that the restriction was no greater
than what was necessary to protect the public from unlicensed
practitioners of law.' 0 3 The court therefore rejected Niska's first
amendment claim and affirmed his conviction.1
0 4
Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc. v. Larson
The dispute in Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc. v.
Larson'0 5 involved the plaintiff, Women's Health, which operates a
medical clinic that performs abortions, 0 6 and the defendant,
Women's Help Clinic, which provides pregnancy tests and
antiabortion counseling. 107 The plaintiffs filed an action for
damages and injunctive relief from the defendant's allegedly
deceptive advertising. 0 8 The defendant appealed from the trial
98. 380 N.W.2d 646 (N.D. 1986).
99. State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 648 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CoDE § 27-11-01 (Supp.
1985) (prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law). Niska drafted a pleading for Richard Schmidt and
advised him in civil and criminal actions. 380 N.W.2d at 648.
100. 380 N.W.2d at 648; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedom of speech).
101. 380 N.W.2d at 649.
102. Id. The court noted that four requirements must be met for a regulation that incidentally
restricts speech to be valid:
1. The regulation is within the constitutional power of the state;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
4. The incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. (citing United States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985)).
103. 380 N.W.2d at 649.
104. Id. at 650-51. The court also rejected Niska's argument that his conviction infringed on his
right of assembly. Id.; see N.D. CoNST. art. 1, SS 4, 5 (guaranteeing the fight of assembly).
105. 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1957 (1986).
106. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 177 (N.D. 1986), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1957 (1986).
107. Id.
108. Id. Women's Health alleged that the Women's Help Clinic, through deceptive advertising
and related activity, misled persons into believing that abortions were performed at the Women's
Help Clinic with the intent of luring people to the clinic to unwittingly receive antiabortion
"propaganda." Id.
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court's preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from any
deceptive advertising and solicitation practices until a final
determination of the plaintiff's claim. 10 9 The defendant raised
several issues on appeal, but the supreme court discussed only
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the
preliminary injunction and whether the defendant's first
amendment rights were infringed upon by the injunction. 1 10
The trial court had determined that Women's Health would
be injured if the defendant was allowed to continue its advertising
practices."' The supreme court agreed that Women's Health had
made a sufficient showing of probable success on the merits of the
case to justify the preliminary injunction."' The court concluded,
therefore, that it was not an abuse of discretion to grant the
preliminary injunction.113
The supreme court also'concluded that the preliminary
injunction was not an unconstitutional prior restraint on the
defendant's first amendment rights." 4 In reaching this conclusion,
it was necessary to determine whether the advertisements were
commercial speech, which receives less first amendment protection
than noncommercial speech. 1 5 The court noted that the Women's
Help Clinic's advertisements were placed in a commercial context
and were directed at the providing of services."16 The court stated
that this was a classic example of commercial speech." 7 The
Women's Help Clinic argued, however, that its advertisements
constituted advocacy of a pro life position and were, therefore,
noncommercial speech."18 The court noted that the advertisements
contained little or no reference to the Women's Help Clinic's
pro life position. 119 The court also stated that an advertiser cannot
109. Id.
110. Id. at 177-83. Women's Health raised the following issues that were not discussed by the
court: whether North Dakota's false advertising law contained in chapter 51-12 of the North Dakota
Century Code was applicable to, or violated by, the Women's Help Clinic's advertisement; and
whether the damages action should have been dismissed because filed on behalf of an unknown,
unnamed fictitious person. Id. at 177-78. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 51-12 (1982) (North Dakota's
prohibition against false advertising). The court did not discuss these issues because, when reviewing
the propriety of a preliminary injunction, it is inappropriate to resolve the merits of the underlying
action. Id. at 183.
111. Id. at 179.
112. Id.
113. Id. The supreme court will set aside a preliminary injunction only if the trial court abused
its discretion in granting the injunction. Id. at 178. The court did strike a provision of the
preliminary injunction that required the Women's Help Clinic to affirmatively state in its
advertisements that it does not perform abortions. Id. at 179. The court stated that this was a
redundant and unnecessary restriction that constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id.
114. Id. at 182; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (right to free speech).
115. 381 N.W.2d at 180.
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take its advertisements out of the area of commercial speech merely
by including references to public issues. 2 0 The court reasoned that
the Women's Help Clinic is entitled to advocate its prolife position
outside the commercial context and receive full first amendment
protection in that situation. 12' The court concluded that the
advertisements were commercial speech and evaluated the
injunction's validity under a relaxed standard of scrutiny. 12
2
In considering whether the injunction was an unconstitutional
prior restraint on protected speech, the court noted that the
injunction proscribed only deceptive and misleading
advertisements. 123 It did not restrict the clinic from advertising its
services altogether. 124 The court also noted that the Women's Help
Clinic had been afforded a hearing before the injunction was
issued. 125 Given the commercial nature of the speech involved, the
court concluded that the preliminary injunction was not an invalid
prior restraint on the Women's Help Clinic's first amendment
rights. 126
State v. Ohnstad
In State v. Ohnstad2 7 Ohnstad appealed from his conviction of
issuing a check without sufficient funds in violation of section 6-08-
16 of the North Dakota Century Code. 128 Ohnstad argued that the
statute was unconstitutionally and discriminately enforced
against him. 129 Ohnstad contended that the Cass County State's
Attorney's practice of sending a notice of dishonor, which specified
that if payment was not made within ten days the State's Attorney
would consider criminal charges, violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 15. of the North Dakota
Constitution, which prohibits imprisonment for debt. 13 0
The supreme court stated that, although section 6-08-16 does
not mandate the sending of a notice of dishonor, it does authorize
the sending of a notice with a demand for timely payment.' 3 1 The
120. Id.
121. Id.





127. 392 N.W.2d 389 (N.D. 1986).
128. State v. Ohnstad, 392 N.W.2d 389, 389 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CODE S 6-08-16
(Supp. 1985) (bad check statute).
129. 392 N.W.2d at 389.
130. Id. at 391;see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S I (equal protection clause); N.D. CONST. art. I,
S15 (prphibiting imprisonment for debt).
131. 392 N.W.2d at 391-92; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 6-08-1
6 (Supp. 1985).
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court noted that over ninety-five percent of the persons charged
with a violation of section 6-08-16 were people who had received
the notice but had not paid the check, and that in most cases, they
would not have been prosecuted had they paid the check. 132 The
court determined that complying with the notice of dishonor and
paying the check was effectively an affirmative defense to a criminal
prosecution based on ability to pay. 133 The court held that this was




In Hutton v. Janz135 the issue before the North Dakota Supreme
Court was whether a livestock pasturage and feeding contract
constituted a sublease. 136 Hutton leased a ranch toJanz in 1982.137
The lease prohibited Janz from subleasing without Hutton's prior
written consent.138 The lease also provided that ifJanz breached the
terms of the lease Hutton could enter the premises and take full and
absolute possession of the ranch.' 39 In 1985 Janz and Amsbaugh
entered into a livestock pasturage and feeding contract without
Hutton's consent. 140 Pursuant to this agreement, Janz agreed to
accept approximately 200 to 250 cattle for pasturage and care on
the Hutton ranch. 141 In return, Amsbaugh agreed to pay Janz
$20,000. 142 Hutton sued Janz for eviction, asserting that Janz had
sublet the property in violation of the lease terms. 143 The trial court
determined that the contract between Janz and Amsbaugh did not
constitute a sublease and therefore dismissed Hutton's claim for
eviction. 144
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that
pasturage contracts are generally not considered assignments or
132. 392 N.W.2d at 392.
133. Id.; see State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980) (statute making it a crime to write
a bad check but allowing subsequent payment as an affirmative defense held unconstitutional).
134. 392 N.W.2d at 392.
135. 387 N.W.2d 494 (N.D. 1986).
136. Hutton v. Janz, 387 N.W.2d 494, 496 (N.D. 1986).






143. Id. Hutton also contended that Janz was in default of the lease for nonpayment of rent,
removing produce in violation of a crop-share agreement, and failing to till the ranch in a good and
husbandlike manner. Id.
144. Id. at 496.
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subleases. 145 The court reasoned, however, that because Janz
transferred to Amsbaugh the right to use all of the grassland and
cropland on the Hutton ranch, the agreement did, in fact,
constitute a sublease. 146 The court also noted that the pasturage
contract resulted in a change in the amount of rent due under the
lease. 14 7 The lease required Janz to pay Hutton "1/3 of the gross
sale proceeds of livestock, farm produce and rentals." 14 8 Because of
the pasturage agreement, however, Hutton was limited to 1/3 of
the amountJanz received from Amsbaugh.14 9 Therefore, the court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of Hutton's claim for eviction. 1 0
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
State v. Sakellson
In State v. Sakellson' 5' the State appealed the district court's
suppression of all evidence seized during a search of the defendants'
residence.15 2 The district court suppressed the evidence on the
grounds that the officers' failure to knock and announce their
presence and purpose before entering constituted a "breaking"
under section 29-29-08 of the North Dakota Century Code. 153 The
supreme court affirmed the district court's ruling. 1
54
The defendants lived on the second floor of a two family
duplex. 155 Each family had a separate entrance. 156 The officers had
a "knock and announce" search warrant requiring them to
announce their authority and purpose before entering. 157 The main
entry door was open when the officers proceeded through without
knocking. 158 On appeal, the State claimed that the officers'
unannounced entry through the open door did not frustrate the
policies behind section 29-29-08".159 Therefore, the State argued,
145. Id. at 497; see, e.g., Harrelson v. Miller & Lux, Inc., 182 Cal. 408, -, 188 P. 800, 802
(1920) (contract by lessee allowing third party to graze sheep on the based premises did not violate
lease term prohibiting subleases). The court stated that the legal effect of a contract is a question of
law, fully reviewable on appeal. 387 N.W.2d at 496-97.
146. 387 N.W.2d at 497-98; see also Enders v. Wesley W. Hubbard & Sons, 95 Idaho 590, __,
513 P.2d 992, 999 (1973) (pasturage contract determined to be a sublease).
147. 387 N.W.2d at 498.
148. Id. at 495.
149. Id. at 498.
150. Id.
151. 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1985).
152. State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 781 (N.D. 1985).
153. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-29-08 (1974) (police can enter house to execute search
warrant only after giving notice of authority and purpose).
154. 379 N.W.2d at 785.




159. Id. at 782. The court stated that the primary policies underlying § 29-29-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code are the protection of privacy in the home and the prevention of violent
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the section was substantially complied with because the officers'
entrance only "minimally infringed" upon the defendants'
reasonable expectations of privacy. 160 The court rejected the State's
argument and held that an entry made through an open door
without permission is a "breaking" under section 29-29-08.161 The
court reasoned that the simple failure to close a door does not create
a reasonable expectation of an uninvited, unannounced entry. 
162
The State also argued that the exclusionary rule was not the
appropriate remedy for a violation of section 29-29-08 because the
rule is not constitutionally mandated.16 3 The court, however,
determined that a police officer's method of entry in executing a
"knock and announce" search warrant is subject to the fourth
amendment's prohibition against unreasonableness.1 6 4 Therefore,
the evidence was properly suppressed. 
1 65
City of Bismarck v. Hoffner
In City of Bismarck v. Hoffner 66 Hoffner appealed from his
conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least
.10.167 Hoffner raised two issues on appeal: whether chapter 39-20
of the North Dakota Century Code applies when voluntary consent
is given to extract a blood specimen, 168  and whether the
plaintiff adequately proved that Hoffner voluntarily waived his
fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search
and seizure. 16 9 The supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling
and upheld Hoffner's conviction. 
1 70
The court stated that the implied consent statute contained in
chapter 39-20 of the North Dakota Century Code does not apply
when an individual voluntarily consents to a blood test. 171 The
confrontations. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-29-08 (1974) (requiring police to give notice of
authority and statement of purpose before entering a home to execute a search warrant).
160. 379 N.W.2d at 782.
161. Id. at 783; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 29-29-08 (1974). The court noted that the policy of
nonconfrontation is furthered by requiring officers to knock and announce before entering an open
door because if the occupant knows it is a police officer at the door he or she won't resort to defensive
measures. Id. at 782.
162. 379 N.W.2d at 782.
163. Id. at 784.
164. Id.; see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1968) ("the method of entering the home ...
[could] offend federal constitutional standards of reasonableness").
165. 379 N.W.2d at 784.
166. 379 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1985).
167. City of Bismarck v. Hoffner, 379 N.W.2d 797, 798 (N.D. 1985).
168. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unlawful search and seizure).
169. 379 N.W.2d at 798; see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-20 (Supp. 1985) (implied consent to
determine alcohol content of blood).
170. 379 N.W.2d at 801.
171. Id. at 798; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1985) (implied consent to determine
alcohol content of blood). The court reaffirmed its holding in State v. Abrahamson. 379 N.W.2d at 799;
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court determined that Hoffner had voluntarily consented to the
blood test and hence, the procedural requirements of chapter 39-20
were inapplicable. 172 The court also stated that the City of
Bismarck had demonstrated that Hoffner had voluntarily
consented to waive his right to be free from an unreasonable search
and seizure.' 73 The court noted that the taking of a blood sample
does constitute a search. 7 4 However, when a person voluntarily
consents to the taking of the blood sample, the fourth amendment is
not violated. 7 5 Therefore, the blood test results were properly
admitted by the trial court. 1
76
Minot Daily News v. Holum
In Minot Daily News v. Holum'7 7 Minot Daily News petitioned
the supreme court for a supervisory writ directing the trial court to
vacate its order closing to the public a preliminary examination in a
criminal case. 17 The trial court had closed the entire preliminary
examination to the public on the grounds that prejudicial evidence,
inadmissible at trial, would be offered at the preliminary hearing
and there was a substantial likelihood that the prejudicial evidence
would interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial and an
impartial jury. 7 9 The supreme court noted that section 29-07-14 of
the North Dakota Century Code permits a trial judge to exercise its
discretion in closing a preliminary hearing. 8 0 The court then set
out a procedure for a trial court to follow when exercising its
discretion under section 29-07-14.181
First, the trial court must independently review the evidence
and determine the character of publicity that the evidence would
generate in an open proceeding. 182 Second, the trial court must
see State v. Abrahamson, 328 N.W.2d 213 (N.D. 1982). In Abrahamson the court determined that, if
an individual voluntarily consents to a blood test, the requirements of section 39-20-01 are
inapplicable. Id. at 215.
172. 379 N.W.2d at 799.
173. See id. at 800-01; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unlawful search and seizure).
174. 379 N.W.2d at 800.
175. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unlawful search and seizure). Consent is an
exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirements. 379 N.W.2d at 800 (citing State v.
Swenningson, 297 (N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1980)).
176. See379 N.W.2d at 800-01.
177. 380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1986).
178. Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347, 348 (N.D. 1986).
179. Id. at 348-49; see Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 338 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1983).
In Dickinson Newspapers the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a hearing may be closed if
there is a substantial likelihood that evidence inadmissible at trial will be admitted and that the
evidence will interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial jury. Id. at 79.
180. 380 N.W.2d at 349; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 29-07-14 (1974).
181. 380 N.W.2d at 349-50.
182. Id. at 350. The supreme court noted that a trial court cannot order closure based only upon
ounsel's assertion that prejudicial evidence, inadmissible at trial, will be admitted at the
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consider alternatives to closure." 3 Third, the trial court may order
closure only to the extent necessary to protect a defendant's right to
a fair trial.'1 4 Fourth, the trial court must articulate its reasons for
ordering closure.185 Finally, the public must be given reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard on motions to close
preliminary examinations. 8 6 Because the trial court had not
followed these procedures when it issued its closure order, the




In State v. Indvik'88 Indvik appealed from a conviction of
reckless endangerment and terrorizing. '8 9 Indvik raised three issues
on appeal: (1) whether psychological evaluations conducted at the
state hospital were sufficient to determine that Indvik did not suffer
from a mental disease or defect; (2) whether there was probable
cause for his arrest; and (3) whether the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence the firearm taken from him following his
arrest. 190
Indvik contended that the examinations were not sufficient
because they were not "independent" as required by statute.' 9 '
The supreme court rejected this contention stating that Indvik had
not shown any actual or potential conflict resulting from the use of
the state hospital staff.192 The court also determined that the initial
stop of Indvik's vehicle was not justified because the officer did not
have a reasonable suspicion that Indvik was engaged in criminal
activity. 93  However, the court determined that Indvik's
subsequent independent actions - fleeing after an attempted stop
preliminary hearing. Id. The trial court may review the evidence in camera if necessary to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. The court stated that the public should be denied access to the proceeding only to the
extent necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id.
185. Id. The court stated that articulation of the trial court's reasons for ordering closure is
essential to intelligent judicial review. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 351.
188. 382 N.W.2d 623 (N.D. 1986).
189. State v. Indvik, 382 N.W.2d 623, 624 (N.D. 1986).
190. Id. at 625. Indvik underwent the psychological examinations pursuant to 5 12.1-04-
03 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.; see N.D. CENNT. CODE ' 12.1-04-03 (1983) (defense of lack
of criminal responsibility). This case was commenced before this section was repealed in 1985. Id.
n.1; seeAct approved Apr. 4, 1985, ch. 173, § 29, 1985 N.D. Laws 523.
191. 382 N.W.2d at 626.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 627. The court stated that an officer must have a reasonable suspicion to suspect that
the defendant is engaged in criminal activity in order to make an investigative stop. Id.; see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (officer must have a reasonably articulable basis or suspicion for
stopping a vehicle for investigation).
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of Indvik's vehicle - dissipated the taint of the prior invalid stop
and created probable cause for his arrest. 94 Because Indvik's arrest
was made on the basis of probable cause, the firearm was properly




In State v. Abell197 Abell was convicted of gross sexual
imposition. 198 The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court
erred in denying Abell's motion for a new trial based upon the
jury's unauthorized use of a dictionary during its deliberations. 199
Both parties agreed that the use of the dictionary constituted jury
misconduct. 20 0 The State contended that Abell was entitled to a
new trial only if he proved that the misconduct was prejudicial.
20 1
Abell contended that he was entitled to a new trial unless the State
could prove that the misconduct was not prejudicial. 20 2 The
supreme court adopted Abell's position, stating that it was
consistent with the rule requiring the State to affirmatively prove
every element of the crime charged. 20 3 Because the State had not
met its burden in proving that the use of the dictionary was not
prejudicial, Abell's conviction was reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial.
20 4
State v. Kingsley
In State v. Kingsley20 5 Kingsley appealed from two judgments of
conviction for gross sexual imposition arising out of Kingsley's
sexual relations with two developmentally disabled women. 20 6 The
194. 382 N.W.2d at 627-28. The court determined that Indvik was stopped when the officer
turned on his red flashing lights warning lndvik to stop. Id. at 627. Indvik ignored the lights and
engaged the officer in a high speed chase and fired a gun at him. Id.
195. Id. at 628.
196. Id.
197. 383 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1986).
198. State v. Abell, 383 N.W.2d 810, 811 (N.D. 1986). Abell's conduct violated S 12.1-20-
03(2)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-20-03(2)(b) (1985)
(gross sexual imposition).
199. 383 N.W.2d at 812. The only element of the offense at issue during the trial was whether
Abell had used force while engaging in sexual contact with a twelve year old girl. Id. at 811. During
its deliberations, the jury received a dictionary from the bailiffand used it to ascertain the meaning of
the word "force." Id.
200. Id. at 812.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. The court recognized that conflicting authority exists on the issue. Id.
204. Id. at 813.
205. 383 N.W.2d 828 (N.D. 1986).
206. State .v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 829 (N.D. 1986). Kingsley's two appeals involved a
single identical legal issue and were consolidated for purpose of argument and decision by the
supreme court. Id. Kingsley was convicted of gross sexual imposition under S 12.1-20-03(1)(e) of the
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issue on appeal was whether the trial court had erred in refusing to
dismiss the charges against Kingsley because the State had not
established a prima facie case. 20 7 Kingsley argued that medical
testimony should have been introduced to establish that the victims
suffered from a mental disease or defect that rendered them
incapable of understanding the nature of their conduct.
208
During Kingsley's trials, a social worker that works with
developmentally disabled persons testified that both victims were
developmentally disabled and incapable of understanding the
incidents that occurred. 20 9 The supreme court stated that expert
medical testimony would have been helpful and would have
presented a stronger case for the prosecution.2 1 0 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the prosecution had "minimally met its
burden of presenting a prima facia case." ' 21 1 Therefore, the court
determined that expert medical testimony was not necessary and
affirmed the judgments of conviction.
21 2
State v. Haugen
In State v. Haugen21 3 Haugen appealed from a judgment of
conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol. 21 4 At his
arraignment, the prosecutor read Haugen his rights during a group
advisory. 215 After the judge arrived, Haugen pleaded not guilty and
stated that he desired a court trial.2 1 6 Haugen then received and
signed a document entitled "Statement of Rights." 21 7 A court trial
North Dakota Century Code. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-20-03(l)(e) (1985). Section 12.1-20-
03(i)(e) provides:
1. A person who engages in a sexual act with another, or who causes another to
engage in a sexual act, is guilty of an offense if:
e. He knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the other person suffers from
a mental disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of understanding
the nature of his or her conduct.
Id.
207. 383 N.W.2d at 829.
208. Id.




212. Id. at 830-31. Justice Levine, in a special concurrence, agreed with the majority's
conclusion that the prosecution had only "minimally" met its burden. Id. at 831 (Levine, J.,
concurring specially). Justice Levine advised the State to present expert medical testimony in future
cases in order to assist the jury in reaching a verdict. Id.
213. 384 N.W.2d 651 (N.D. 1986).
214. State v. Haugen, 384 N.W.2d 651, 651 (N.D. 1986).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 652. Haugen was not represented by counsel at his arraignment, but had spoken with
an attorney by telephone. Id.
217. Id. The record was silent concerning whether Haugen had been given time to read the
"Statement of Rights' or whether he had asked for any explanation of its terms. Id.
19871
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was held at which Haugen was found guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol.2 18 Haugen appealed, arguing that he had not
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a trial by
jury. 2
19
The supreme court recognized the importance of the right to a
trial by jury and stated that a trial court has a duty to determine
whether a detendant's waiver of the right is a "voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent decision 'done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' ' 220 The court
noted that the prosecutor's statements at the group advisory did not
adequately explain the differences between a court trial and a jury
trial. 221 The court was also troubled by the use of the prosecutor, an
adversarial party, to inform Haugen of his rights. 222 Rule 5 of the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a
magistrate explain to a defendant his or her rights. 223 The court
stated that it was important for a detached and neutral person to
perform this function. 224 Because the court did not feel that Haugen
understood the implications of his request for a court trial,
Haugen's judgment of conviction was reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial.
225
State v. Cummings
In State v. Cummings226 the North Dakota Supreme Court
vacated the defendant's sentence for driving while under the
influence (DUI) and reduced to time served his sentence for driving
while license suspended (DUS). 227 The defendant had previously
been convicted of DUI in 1983 and 1984.228 Because the State could
not prove that the defendant had made a valid waiver of counsel in
his 1983 conviction, it charged Cummings with DUI with only one
prior conviction in the preceding five years. 229 Cummings pleaded
218. Id.
219. Id. at 651; SeeN.D. CONST. art. I, § 13 (guaranteeing right oftrial byjury).
220. 384 N.W.2d at 653 (quoting State v. Kranz, 353 N.W.2d 748, 751 (N.D. 1984)).
221. Id. Haugen stated that he requested a court trial because he believed that he would have to
pay for a.jury trial. Id.
222. Id. The court noted that although the goals of expediency and efficient administration of
justice may be considered when streamlining court procedures, they do not justify displacing
fundamental rights. Id.
223. Id.; see N.D.R. CRIM. P. 5.
224. 384 N.W.2d at 653.
225. Id. at 654.
226. 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1986).
227. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 469, 473 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-
08-01 (Supp. 1985) (prohibition against driving while under the influence); id. § 39-06-42 (penalty
for driving with a suspended or revoked license).
228. 386 N.W.2d at 469.
229. Id. Cummings conceded that he had validly waived counsel in his 1984 DUI conviction. Id.
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guilty. 230 In sentencing the defendant to thirty days in jail, the
judge announced that she had imposed a harsher sentence because
of the 1983 uncounseled DUI conviction.2 31 On appeal, Cummings
contended that the 1983 uncounseled conviction was an
impermissible factor in determining his sentence. 23 2
The supreme court noted that the trial judge's sentence could
be set aside only if the judge had substantially relied on an
impermissible factor in determining the sentence's severity. 233 The
court recognized, however, that constitutional limitations exist
concerning what a judge may consider during sentencing.2 34 The
North Dakota Supreme Court, in 1985, had determined' that,
absent a valid waiver of counsel, the use of an uncounseled DUI
conviction to enhance a term of incarceration for a subsequent DUI
offense violates the North Dakota Constitution. 235 Because the trial
judge had relied exclusively on Cummings' 1983 uncounseled DUI
conviction to lengthen his jail sentence, the court vacated the thirty
day jail sentence and remanded the case. 23 6
Cummings had also pleaded guilty to the DUS charge and was
sentenced to fifteen days imprisonment pursuant to section 39-06-
42 of the North Dakota Century Code as it existed prior to its 1985
amendment.2 37 The section was amended in 1985 to reduce the
mandatory minimum sentence to four consecutive days
imprisonment. 238 Cummings committed the offense on June 15,
1985, after the amendment had been passed, but before its effective
date of July 1, 1985.239 Cummings was sentenced after July 1,
1985.240 The issue on appeal was which statute applied to
Cummings' sentencing: the statute in effect when the offense was
230. Id.
231. Id. In addition to a sentence of 30 days in jail, Cummings was fined $500. Id.; see N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01(6) (1985) (penalty for class B misdemeanor); id. S 39-08-01(5)(b) (Supp.
1985) (penalty for second DUI offense within five years).
232. 386 N.W.2d at 469.
233. Id. (citing State v. Rudolph, 260 N.W.2d 13 (N.D. 1977)).
234. Id. (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) (use of misinformation in
sentencing decision violates due process)).
235. See State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 178-79 (N.D. 1985) (the use of an uncounseled
conviction to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense violates S 12 of article I of the North
Dakota Constitution, which guarantees counsel to an accused); see also N.D. CONST. art. I, S 12.
236. 386 N.W.2d at 469. justice VandeWalle dissented, stating that he did not believe that the
use of a prior uncounseled conviction during sentencing was a constitutional issue. Id. at 473
(VandeWalle, J., dissenting). Justice VandeWalle also stated that the burden should be on the
defendant, not the State, to prove that there had not been a valid waiver ofcounsel. Id. at 474.
237. Id. at 469-70; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-06-42 (1979) (amended; current version at N.D.
CENT. CODE S 39-06-42 (Supp. 1985)).
238. 386 N.W.2d at 470; see DUI Administrative and Criminal Provisions Act, ch. 429, 5 4,
1985 N.D. Laws 1545 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-06-42 (Supp. 1985)).
239. 386 N.W.2d at 470.
240. Id.
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committed, or the statute in effect at the time of sentencing. 24'
The court recognized the general rule that statutes do not
operate retroactively unless the legislature expressly declares
otherwise. 242 The court, however, inferred that the legislature had
intended the 1985 statute to apply retroactively. 243 The court stated
that the legislature had determined that the lighter sentence was
more appropriate for DUS convictions and accordingly, had
reduced the mandatory sentence from fifteen days to four
consecutive days. 24 4 The court determined that the ameliorating
amendment to the criminal statute was indicative of the
legislature's conclusion that the lesser punishment was the
appropriate penalty. 245 Thus, the court created an exception to the
general rule that statues do not operate retroactively unless
expressly declared by the legislature. 24 6 Because Cummings had




In State v. VandeHoven248 VandeHoven appealed from an order
denying suppression of a blood sample and from his conviction for
driving while under the influence of alcohol and possession of an
alcoholic beverage by a person under the age of twenty-one. 24 9
VandeHoven raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether there was
sufficient probable cause to stop him; 250 (2) whether the blood-
alcohol test was fairly administered; 25 ' and (3) whether the six
month delay between the trial and the court's decision deprived
him of his rights to a speedy trial and due process of law.
252
The court rejected the defendant's contentions and affirmed the
trial court's decision.
253
The court employed the "articulable and reasonable
241. Id.
242. Id. at 471. Section 1-02-10 of the North Dakota Century Code states that "[nlo part of this
code is retroactive unless it is expressly declared to be so." N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-10 (1975).
243. 386 N.W.2d at 472.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. The court declined to follow an earlier case in which it had determined that an
ameliorating amendment to a penal statute could not be applied retroactively. Id.; see State v.
Kaufman, 310 N.W.2d 709 (N.D. 1981).
247. 386 N.W.2d at 472-73.
248. 388 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1986).
249. State v. VandeHoven, 388 N.W.2d 857, 857 (N.D. 1986).
250. Id. at 858. The court noted that the parties mistakenly focused on whether there was
"probable cause to stop" VandeHoven. Id. at 858 n. 1. The court recognized that the better form of
analysis employs the "reasonable suspicion" standard in evaluating whether a stop was valid. Id.
251. Id. at 858.
252. Id.; see N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12 (providing for right to speedy trial and due process).
253. 388 N.W.2d at 860.
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suspicion" standard in determining the validity of the stop. 254 The
court also noted that once a reasonable suspicion has been formed,
subsequent non-suspicious actions are irrelevant to a reasonably
prompt stop of a vehicle. 255 Thus, the initial erratic movement of
the defendant's vehicle gave the officer reasonable suspicion and
justified the stop. 2
56
The supreme court next considered whether the blood test had
been fairly administered. 257 The court noted that a disputable
presumption of regularity applies to the official acts of the state
toxicologist and that the presumption was not contradicted. 258 The
court also stated that the certification submitted under the state
toxicologist's signature was sufficient to certify that the method,
equipment, and person operating that particular test were
approved by the state toxicologist. 259 The court noted that the
signature of a state employee who conducted the blood test on the
blood analysis report was sufficient to comply with the statutory
requirement that the report be signed by the state toxicologist. 260
Therefore, the court concluded that the blood test had been fairly
administered. 261
The supreme court rejected the defendant's final argument
that the delay of six months between the trial and the lower court's
decisi6n deprived him of his right to a speedy trial. 262 The court
stated that the right to a speedy trial involves the time period from
the formal accusation to the trial date and not the time between the
trial and the trial court's decision. 263 Thus, the court concluded
that the trial, which occurred two months after the issuance of the
254. Id. at 858. The court recognized that a police officer must have an articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating the law to make a valid investigative stop. Id. (citing
State v. Indvick, 382 N.W.2d 623 (N.D. 1986)).
255. Id. at 859.
256. Id. The officers observed the defendant's vehicle veer sharply to the right and then to the
left, crossing over the unmarked center of the roadway. Id. at 857.
257. Id. at 859-60. The defendant argued that the State must provide full proof that the blood-
alcohol equipment was in proper order, that the operator was qualified, and that the test was given
properly. Id. at 859 (citing State v. Salhus, 220 N.W.2d 852, 857 (N.D. 1974)). The court, however,
recognized that Salhus applies only to laypersons operating alcohol detection devices and not to
experts. Id. at 859 (citing State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 865 (N.D. 1976)).
258. 388 N.W.2d at 859; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 31-11-03(15) (1976) (disputable
presumptions).
259. 388 N.W.2d at 860; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-20-07(8) (1983) (certified copy of analytical
report is prima facie evidence of the result of the test) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-
07(8) (Supp. 1985)).
260. 388 N.W.2d at 860. The court stated that the legislature intended to allow the state
toxicologist to delegate authority to run the tests. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. The defendant relied on article I, 5 12 of the North Dakota Constitution, which
provides: "In criminal prosecutions in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right to a
speedy and public trial .... No person shall . . .be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 12.
263. 388 N.W.2d at 860.
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citations, created no prejudice by delay. 264 The supreme court




In State v. Key2 6 6 the defendant, Key, appealed from his
conviction for violating a drivers license restriction. 267 Key was
convicted of the traffic offense during a bench trial. 268 On appeal,
Key argued that his judgment of conviction should be reversed
because he had not waived his right to a jury trial pursuant to rule
23(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 69 The
State contended that, because Key had already served his entire
sentence, the issue was moot and there was no remedy available to
Key. 2
70
The supreme court stated that when a criminal defendant has
served his or her entire prison term, an appeal will not be
considered moot if either one of two conditions are met t.2 7 The two
conditions are: '" 1) That the defendant could not have brought his
case to the appellate court for review before the expiration of his
sentence, and 2) that further penalties or disabilities can be
imposed as a result of the judgment which has been satisfied.'
272
The court noted that Key's conviction could result in the
imposition of a harsher sentence for a future violation.273 Because
of the possible detrimental effect that the conviction could have on
Key in the future, the court concluded that the second condition
had been satisfied and, accordingly, the issue was not moot. 274 The
court, therefore, reversed and remanded for a new trial.
275
State v. Schneider
In State v. Schneider27 6 Schneider appealed from a conviction of
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 388 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1986).
267. State v. Key, 388 N.W.2d 866, 867 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-17(4)
(1980) (authorizing revocation of drivers license for the violation of drivers license restrictions).
268. 388 N.W.2d at 867. The case was originally scheduled as a jury trial. Id. However, because
neither Key nor his attorney confirmed the date of the jury trial, as requested by the court, the case
was rescheduled as a bench trial. Id.
269. Id.; see N.D.R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
270. 388 N.W.2d at 867.
271. Id. at 868.
272. Id. (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)).
273. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(7) (1985) (factors to consider when sentencing
include prior delinquency or criminal activity).
274. 388 N.W.2d at 868.
275. Id.
276. 389 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1986).
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possession of a controlled substance.277 Schneider was stopped for
speeding by a police officer who subsequently noticed a bulge under
Schneider's coat.2 78 The bulge appeared to the police officer to be a
revolver in a shoulder holster.2 79 The officer conducted a pat-down
search of Schneider and, feeling a "solid lump," opened
Schneider's jacket where he found a freezer bag containing
marijuana. 280 Schneider moved to suppress the evidence, claiming
that the marijuana was obtained by an illegal search that violated
his fourth amendment rights. 28' The motion was denied. 28 2 On
appeal, the supreme court held that the search did not violate
Schneider's ,fourth amendment rights.
283
The court recognized that, pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio,284 a police officer may
stop and frisk an individual in certain well delineated
situations. 28 5 A police officer may search a suspect's outer clothing
for weapons if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is
"armed and presently dangerous. ' 28 6 The court noted that a
reasonable basis existed for the police officer's suspicion that
Schneider was armed. 28 7 Schneider argued, however, that the State
had not proven that the officer believed Schneider was "presently
dangerous.' '288 The supreme court rejected Schneider's
argument. 289 The court reasoned that the police officer's knowledge
of Schneider's previous felony conviction for possession of drugs
gave the officer reason to believe that Schneider was presently
dangerous.290 The supreme court, therefore, concluded that the
search was consistent with the fourth amendment and affirmed the
trial court's conviction of Schneider for possession of a controlled
substance.
291




281. Id. at 605; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure).
282. 389 N.W.2d at 605. The lower court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
marijuana based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio. Id.; see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (an officer may conduct a limited search of a person's outer clothing to
discover weapons under certain well delineated circumstances).
283. 389 N.W.2d at 605; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable search and
seizure).
284. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
285. 389 N.W.2d at 605; seeTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
286. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30.
287. 389 N.W.2d at 605.
288. Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30 (authorizing a limited search if officer reasonably
believes that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous). Schneider argued that the police
officer, because of his prior knowledge of Schneider's reputation in the community, perceived a
danger merely because of the reasonable belief that Schneider was armed. 389 N.W.2d at 605.
289. 389 N.W.2d at 605.
290. Id. The police officer testified that he believed Schneider was "presently dangerous"
because Schneider had no reason to carry a gun. Id.
291. Id. at 606; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure).
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State v. Ferguson
In State v. Ferguson292 Ferguson appealed from his conviction of
terrorizing.293 Ferguson allegedly made several harassing telephone
calls to an elderly woman involving threatening, sexually oriented
comments. 294 The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial
court erred in admitting into evidence the woman's pretrial
identification of Ferguson's voice in light of the fact that Ferguson's
counsel was neither notified of, nor present during, the
identification process.295  Ferguson argued that his sixth
amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was
not present during the identification process. 296 The supreme court
determined that, because the accused is not present during a
pretrial voice identification procedure, there is no confrontation
and, therefore, no sixth amendment right to have. counsel
present. 297  Thus, the court concluded that Ferguson's sixth
amendment right to counsel was not violated. 2
98
State v. Haugen
In State v. Haugen299 the defendants appealed from criminal
judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding them guilty of
mailing threatening letters to the Griggs County Board of
Commissioners in violation of section 12.1-12-06(2)(b) of the
North Dakota Century Code. 300 The defendants asserted that the
letters, which threatened the commencement of "Civil and
292. 391 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 1986).
293. State v. Ferguson, 391 N.W.2d 172, 173 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-17-04
(1985) (defining the crime of terrorizing).
294. 391 N.W.2d at 173.
295. Id. at 177. On a separate issue, the court determined that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of Ferguson's prior conviction of gross sexual imposition. Id. at 174; see N.D.R. EvID.
404(b) (admissibility of character evidence). Because the court determined that the only effect of this
evidence was to demonstrate criminal character or propensity, the court stated that the preiudicial
effect of its admission into evidence necessitated a reversal of the conviction. 391 N.W.2d at 175.
296. 391 N.W.2d at 177; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (rights of an accused when prosecuted).
297. 391 N.W.2d at 177; see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). In Ash the United States
Supreme Court determined that the sixth amendment does not afford an accused the r;ght to counsel
at a post indictment photographic display identification. Id. at 321.
298. 391 N.W.2d at 177; see also United States v. Kim, 577 F.2d 473, 480 (9th Cir. 1978)
(accused has no right to an attorney at a pretrial voice identification because the identification is not a
"critical stage" of the criminal proceedings).
299. 392 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1986).
300. State v. Haugen, 392 N.W.2d 799, 800 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-12-
06(2)(b) (1985). Section 12.1-12-06(2)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code provides that "[a]
person is guilty of a Class C felony if, with intent to influence another's official action as a public
servant, he threatens: . .. [to accuse anyone of a crime . Id. The defendants' convictions
stemmed from allegedly threatening letters mailed to the Griggs County Board of Commissioners
following the commissioners' adoption of a resolution recommending that Griggs County State's
Attorney James Wold file a complaint with the Governor seeking the removal of Sheriff Vernon
Fuglestad from office. 392 N.W.2d at 800.
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Criminal process [against the county commissioners] for
DAMAGES," did not violate section 12.1-12-06(2)(b). 30 1 The
supreme court agreed, stating that the defendants' letters did not
fall within the proscription of section 12.1-12-06(2)(b) in light of
the statute's legislative history, 30 2  the first amendment to the
United States Constitution, 30 3 and North Dakota's constitutional
provision "guaranteeing the right of the people to apply to public
officials for redress of grievances by remonstrance.' '304 The court
concluded, as a matter of law, that the letters could reasonably be
construed only as a threat to commence a civil action against the
commissioners to induce them to conform their conduct to what the
defendants perceived the law to be. 30 5 The court, therefore,




In Olmstead v. Miller30 7 Charles Miller appealed from a
judgment awarding the Olmsteads compensatory and punitive
damages. 30 8 Miller was driving a vehicle which left the road and
crashed into the Olmsteads' trailer house. 309 The Olmsteads were
inside their trailer when the accident occurred. 310 The primary
issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in instructing the
jury that it could award damages to the Olmsteads for their future
301. 392 N.W.2d at 801, 802.
302. Id. at 804, 805. The court examined the drafters' comments to the proposed Federal
Criminal Code's provision concerning threatening public servants, which is identical to S 12.1-12-
06(2)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 803-04. Compare FED. CRIM. CODE S 1366 and
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws I, working Papers 592 (1970) with N.D.
CENT. CODE S 12.1-12-06 (1985). The court stated that not all threats to accuse a public official of a
crime were intended to be proscribed by the statute. 392 N.W.2d at 804 (citing National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws I, Working Papers 592 (1970)).
303. Id. at 804; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (right to free speech). The court stated that a threat is
not constitutionally protected if the "character, intent and circumstances of the threat are narrowly
circumscribed." Id. at 803. Threats, however, must be carefully distinguished from protected speech
when the alleged threat is made in the midst of what might be protected political expression. Id.; see
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
304. 392 N.W.2d at 804-05; see N.D. CONST. art. 1, S 5. Remonstrance is defined as "[a] formal
protest against the policy or conduct of the government or of certain officials drawn up and presented
by aggrieved citizens." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1164 (5th ed. 1979).
305. 392 N.W.2d at 805-06. The court noted that S 12.1-12-06(2)(b) of the North Dakota
Century Code does not proscribe threats to bring a civil action against a public official. Id. at 805; see
N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-12-06(2)(b) (1985).
306. 392 N.W.2d at 806.
307. 383 N.W.2d 817 (N.D. 1986).
308. Olmstead v. Miller, 383 N.W.2d 817, 819 (N.D. 1986). The jury found that Miller had
negligently caused the Olmsteads to suffer personal iniuries and property damage. Id. The jury
awarded the Olmsteads $60,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. Id.
309. Id. Miller was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. Id.
310. Id.
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pain and suffering. 3t ' Miller argued that the Olmsteads had not
introduced sufficient evidence to warrant the jury instruction. 31 2
The supreme court noted that no expert medical testimony
had been presented during the trial.31 3 While the court declined to
adopt an absolute rule requiring expert medical testimony before
the issue of future damages may be submitted to a jury, the court
noted that future damages must be proved with reasonable
certainty. 314 The court stated that the Olmsteads had not proven
with reasonable medical certainty that medical services would be
necessary in the future; nor had they established that they would
suffer from future pain. 315 Therefore, the court concluded that the
evidence was insufficient to warrant instructing the jury that
damages for future pain and suffering could be awarded.3 1 6
Because the jury had awarded the Olmsteads a lump sum for
compensatory damages, it was impossible for the supreme court to
determine what portion of the award was for future damages.3 1 7
Thus, the court reversed the entire award for compensatory
damages. 318 The court also reversed the punitive damage award,
stating that it was better practice and procedure for the same jury to
consider and assess both compensatory and punitive damages.3t 9
The court went on to determine that, when assessing punitive
damages, the poverty or wealth of the plaintiff is immaterial and
may not properly be considered by the jury. 320 The court reversed
311. Id. at 820-21. Miller also argued that his action was controlled by chapter 26-41 of the
North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 819; see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26-41 (1978) (Auto Accident
Reparations Act) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26.1-41 (Supp. 1985)). Because the
Olmsteads were not "pedestrians," however, the court determined that chapter 26-41 was
inapplicable. 383 N.W.2d at 820.
312. 383 N.W.2d at 821.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 821-22; see 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY, DAMAGES 5 3.03[21, at
93-94 (1984) (expert testimony is required to establish future pain and suffering when the injury is
subjective in character).
315. 383 N.W.2d at 822.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. Justice Meschke dissented from the court's determination that the verdict for
compensatory damages must be set aside. Id. at 823 (Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Meschke stated that it was within the jury's competence to determine the correct amount of
damages for future pain and suffering from the Olmsteads' testimony that they suffered pain from
the date of injury to the time of trial. Id. at 824.
319. Id. at 822-23. lustice Meschke dissented from the court's reversal of the punitive damages
award. Id. at 825 (Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Meschke stated that, because
there was evidence that the Olmsteads had suffered actual damages, there was no reason to set aside
the punitive damage award. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-03-07 (Supp. 1985) (conditions that
authorize the trier of fact to award punitive damages).
320. 383 N.W.2d at 823. Justice Meschke dissented from the court's determination that
evidence of the plaintiff's wealth is immaterial when assessing punitive damages. Id. at 825
(Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Meschke stated that evidence of the plaintiff's








State Bank v. Nester
In State Bank v. Nester322 Williams appealed from a judgment
against him for the unpaid balance of a note which he had
cosigned. 323 Nester executed three notes to the State Bank of
Streeter and pledged the assets of his business as collateral.
3 24
Williams cosigned two of the three notes. 325 The parties did not
have an agreement governing the allocation of proceeds from a sale
of the collateral in the event of default. 326 When Nester defaulted,
the bank sued Nester and Williams for the entire amount and sold
the collateral securing the notes. 327 The bank applied the proceeds
to satisfy in full one note cosigned by Williams and to satisty in part
the note signed by Nester alone. 32 8 None of the proceeds was
applied to the second note cosigned by Williams. 329 The bank
recovered a judgment against Williams for the full amount of this
note and Williams appealed. 330 The primary issue on appeal was
whether the trial court erred in finding Williams fully liable on the




Williams argued that section 9-12-07 of the North Dakota
Century Code governed the allocation of proceeds. 332 However,
because the collateral was not sold due to a voluntary act of Nester,
but rather through a court ordered liquidation, the court stated that
section 9-12-07 was inapplicable.3 33 The supreme court stated that
the allocation of proceeds from the sale of collateral was governed
by the principle of equitable allocation. 334 The court determined
321. ld. at 823.
322. 385 N.W.2d 95 (N.D. 1986).
323. State Bank v. Nester, 385 N.W.2d. 95, 96 (N.D. 1986).
324. Id.








332. Id. at 97; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-12-07 (1975) (performance when a debtor has several
obhligations).
333. 385 N.W.2d at 97. The court stated that %9-12-07 applies only when a debtor voluntarily
does an act towards performance, such as a payment to a creditor. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-12-
07(1975).
334. 385 N.W.2d at 97. Because § 9-12-07 of the North Dakota Century Code was inapplicable,
;ind the parties had not agreed on how to allocate the proceeds, the supreme court stated that the trial
cotrt had a duty to allocate the proceeds based on principles of equity and justice, Id.
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that the proceeds from the sale of the collateral should have been
distributed ratably among the three notes. 335 Therefore, the court
reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case.
336
DRAM SHOP ACT
Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp.
In Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp. 337 the Meshefskis appealed from a
judgment dismissing their action against Shirnan Corporation for
damages arising out of the death of their son, and from an order
denying their motion for a new trial.338 The Meshefskis' son was
stabbed by Lorenzo Leal during a fight which took place in a bar
owned and operated by Shirnan Corporation.3 39 He died as a result
of the stabbing. 340 The Meshefskis sued Shirnan Corporation
pursuant to North Dakota's Dram Shop Act, which provides that a
"person who is injured by any intoxicated person, or in
consequence of intoxication, has a claim for relief against any
person who caused such intoxication by. . . selling. . . alcoholic
beverages contrary to statute for all damages sustained .. '341
Section 5-01-09 of the North Dakota Century Code makes it
unlawful for a person to deliver alcoholic beverages to an
intoxicated person.
34 2
On appeal, the Meshefskis argued that the trial court had
erred in instructing the jury that in order to award the Meshefskis
damages it had to find that the intoxication caused Meshefski's
death. 343 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that it is not
necessary, under the Dram Shop Act, to prove that intoxication
was the proximate cause of the injury. 34 4 It is sufficient if the injury
was inflicted by an affirmative act of an intoxicated person.3 45
335. Id. The court recognized that the courts are divided in applying the principle of equitable
apportionment. Id. Compare First Nat'l City Bank v. Kline, 439 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(ratable distribution) with Ohio Elect. Car Co. v. LeSage, 198 Cal. 705, 247 P. 190 (1926) (satisfy
the least secured debt tirst).
336. 385 N.W.2d at 99.
337. 385 N.W.2d 474 (N.D. 1986).
338. Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp., 385 N.W.2d 474, 475 (N.D. 1986).
339. Id. Both Meshefski and Lorenzo Leal had consumed an undetermined amount of alcohol
during the evening the stabbing took place. Id. At trial, there was testimony that Leal may also have
been intoxicated from the use of drugs. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 5-01-06 (Supp. 1985).
342. N.D. CENT. CODE S 5-01-09 (1975).
343. 385 N.W.2d at 476. The Meshefskis argued that the trial court erroneously allowed the
jury to return a verdict for Shirnan Corporation upon finding that Leal would have stabbed
Meshefski even if Leal had been sober. Id.
344. Id. (quoting Annotation, Liability of Liquor Furnisher Under Civil Damage or DramShop Act./or
Injury or Death of Intoxicated Person from WronefulAct of a Third Person, 65 A.L.R.2d 923 (1959)).
345. Id.; see also Lee v. Hederman, 158 Iowa 719, 722, 138 N.W. 893, 894 (1912) ("lilt is
enough that the injury was by an intoxicated person, regardless of whether it would have been
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Because the trial court's instruction was erroneous, the supreme
court reversed the judgment and the order denying a new trial.1
4 6
EVIDENCE
State ex rel. Spaeth v. Eddy Furniture Co.
In State ex rel Spaeth v. Eddy Furniture Co. 341 the issue before the
North Dakota Supreme Court was the appropriate evidentiary
standard to be applied in a proceeding concerning alleged
violations of the consumer fraud and false advertising statutes.3
4 8
Eddy Furniture contended that the State was required to prove the
alleged fraud by clear and convincing evidence. 34 9 The State
contended that only a preponderance of the evidence was
required.
350
The supreme court noted that clear and convincing evidence
of fraud is generally required in civil cases. 35 1 However, the court
recognized that consumer protection statutes are enacted in order
to provide injured consumers a remedy that is easier to establish
than is common-law fraud under the clear and convincing
standard. 352 Additionally, the court noted that consumer protection
statutes are remedial in nature and must, therefore, be liberally
construed in favor of protecting consumers. 353 Thus, the court held
that, in actions brought under North Dakota's false advertising and
consumer fraud statutes, the fraudulent conduct need be proved
only by a preponderance of the evidence.
354
committed by him if sober"); King v. Partridge, 9 Mich. App. 540, -, 157 N.W.2d 417, 419
(1968) (plaintiff need not prove that intoxication was the proximate cause of the injury).
346. 385 N.W.2d at 477. The court also determined that the trial court had erred in instructing
the jury that, under the Dram Shop Act, a person's intoxication must "result from the use of
alcoholic beverages." Id. at 477-78. The court stated that a vendor of alcoholic beverages should not
deliver alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, regardless of the cause of the intoxication. Id. at
477. The court stated that there is no functional difference between intoxication from the use of
alcoholic beverages and intoxication from the use of drugs other than alcohol. Id. at 477-78.
347. 386 N.W.2d 901 (N.D. 1986).
348. State ex rel. Spaeth v. Eddy Furniture Co., 386 N.W.2d 901, 902 (N.D. 1986); see N.D.
CENT. CODE chs. 51-12, -15 (1982). William Peterson was hired to conduct a "going out of business"
sale for Eddy Furniture. 386 N.W.2d at 901-02. New furniture was ordered for the sale and was sold
along with the existing inventory. Id. at 902. The State contended that it was fraudulent and
deceptive to represent that the sale was a "going out of business sale" when new merchandise was
added to the existing stock for the sale. Id. at 904. Specifically, the State asserted that sections 51- 12-
01, 51-12-08, and 51-15-02 of the North Dakota Century Code were violated. Id. at 903; see N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 51-12-01, - 08, 51-15-02 (1982) (prohibiting false and misleading advertisements).
349. 386 N.W.2d at 902.
350. Id.
351. Id.; see e.g., Russell Land Co. v. Mandan Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 377 N.W.2d
549, 552 (N.D. 1985) (fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
352. 386 N.W.2d at 903 (citing Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC, Inc., 136 Ariz. 338, 343-44, 666 P.2d
83, 88-89 (Ct. App. 1983)).
353. Id.
354. Id. The court recognized that a split of authority exists on the question of the appropriate
evidentiary standard to be applied in consumer fraud actions. Id. Compare Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC,
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R &DAmusement Corp. v. Christianson
In R & D Amusement Corp. v. Christianson355 Gem Investment
Group (Gem) appealed from a judgment in favor of R & D
Amusement Corporation (R & D).3 56 R & D leased a theatre
housed in a building owned by Gem. 357 In 1976 R & D had
installed air conditioning in the theatre, allegedly pursuant to a cost
sharing agreement with Gem's predecessor in interest. 358 R & D
stopped operating the theatre in 1980.359 In 1982, R & D removed
equipment it had stored in the theatre and also removed heating
units which it had installed.3 60 R & D sued Gem in 1983 to recover
a portion of the air conditioning costs, alleging that the cost sharing
agreement with Gem's predecessor in interest was binding upon
Gem. 361 Gem denied liability and counterclaimed, stating that R &
D had wrongfully removed the heating units.362 The trial court
dismissed Gem's counterclaim and held Gem liable for a portion of
the air conditioning costs.
36 3
On appeal, Gem argued that the 1976 cost sharing agreement
was improperly admitted into evidence because it had not been
properly authenticated.3 64 The supreme court agreed. 365 The
agreement had been signed by only one person, Robert H.
Thieren, and no testimony was offered to show that Thieren had
actually signed the agreement. 366 The court concluded that R & D
had failed to introduce evidence that would "allow a reasonable
fact finder to conclude that it was Thieren's signature on the
memorandum agreement. ' 367 Therefore, the court determined
Inc., 136 Ariz. 338, 343-44, 666 P.2d 83, 88-89 (Ct. App. 1983) (clear and convincing evidence
standard does not apply in actions brought under consumer fraud statutes) with Deer Creek Constr.
Co. v. Peterson, 412 So. 2d 1169, 1173 (Miss. 1982) (clear and convincing evidence standard
applicable to actions brought pursuant to state's consumer fraud statutes).
355. 392 N.W.2d 385 (N.D. 1986).




360. Id. at 385-86. The equipment was stored in the theatre with the consent of the A & G
Company, Gem's predecessor in interest. Id. at 385.
361. Id. at 386.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.; see N.D.R. EviD. 901(a) (requirements of authentication). Authentication is a means of
establishing a document's relevancy. 392 N.W.2d at 386. If a document is not authenticated, it is
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Id.; see N.D.R. EvIn. 402 (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible).
365. 392 N.W.2d at 386. The court stated that it is within the trial court's discretion to
determine whether evidence should be excluded for lack of authentication. Id. To constitute
reversible error, the trial court's action must have been unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Id.
366. Id. at 386-87.
367. Id. at 387.
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that, because the agreement was not properly authenticated, the
trial court had abused its discretion in allowing it into evidence.
368
On a separate issue, R & D argued that the heating units
constituted trade fixtures and could lawfully be removed under
section 47-06-04 of the North Dakota Century Code. 36 9 The court
agreed that the units were trade fixtures.3 70 The court noted that
the equipment was not permanently attached to the building and
could be removed without damage.3 7 ' Thus, the court affirmed the
dismissal of Gem's counterclaim and reversed the judgment





In Rustand v. Rustand 373  Elizabeth Rustand Strothman
appealed from an amended judgment that granted Keith Rustand's
motion to terminate the portion of their divorce judgment that
directed Keith to pay Elizabeth $2500 per month "alimony,
support and maintenance. ' 374 The primary issue of Elizabeth's
appeal was whether the $2500 monthly award of "alimony,
support and maintenance" should terminate because of her
remarriage. 375 The supreme court stated that before it could
determine whether or not to terminate the monthly payments, it
would have to establish what the predivorce agreement, which was
incorporated into the divorce judgment, meant by the word
''alimony.'' 376 Elizabeth contended that, although the $2500
payment was labeled alimony, the payment was, in reality, a
combination of a property settlement, child support, and spousal
support.377
368. Id.
369. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-06-04 (1978) (trade fixtures may be removed by tenant of
leased premises).
. 370. 392 N.W.2d at 388. The court listed three factors used in determining whether an item is a
trade fixture: "(1) the means by which it has been annexed to the real estate; (2) whether it is adapted
io and necessary for the purpose for which the premises is devoted; and (3) whether the parties
intended that the article become a permanent part of the realty." Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. 379 N.W.2d 806 (N.D. 1986).
374. Rustand v. Rustand, 379 N.W.2d 806, 807 (N.D. 1986). Elizabeth and Keith obtained
a default divorce. Id. Prior to their divorce, they had an attorney prepare an agreement
outlining the property distribution, custody, and spousal support. Id. The agreement granted $2500
per month "[qor the support and maintenance of Defendant I Elizabethi, and in full discharge of her
right to alimony, support and maintenance .... Id. at 808. The predivorce agreemtent was
incorporated into the divorce judgment. Id.
375. Id. at 807.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 808.
1987]
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The supreme court noted that the word alimony is used to
describe several award concepts. 37 8 Permanent support is awarded
to provide maintenance to a spouse who is incapable of
rehabilitation. 7 9 Because Elizabeth was young and currently
employed, the court stated that she was not a candidate for
permanent spousal support. 380 Rehabilitative spousal support is
awarded to a disadvantaged spouse to enable him or her to become
self-supporting. 3 8' The court determined that a portion of the
$2500 monthly payment could have been rehabilitative support
because it enabled Elizabeth to relocate and begin a new career
after the divorce.3 82 The court also determined that the language of
the divorce decree supported Elizabeth's contention that a portion
of the monthly payment was composed of a property settlement.
38 3
The supreme court reversed and remanded the portion of the
amended judgment concerning the "alimony" award.384 The court
directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine the value of the marital property as of the divorce date
and, in addition, to identify what portions of the $2500 monthly
payment constituted a property distribution, permanent
spousal support, rehabilitative spousal support, or child support.
3 85
INDIAN LAW
McKenzie County Social Services Board v. V. G.
In McKenzie County Social Services Board v. V. G.3 86 V.G., a
member of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation, appealed from the determination that V.G. was the
378. Id. at 807. Because the label alimony has a variety of interpretations, the court directed
trial judges and attorneys to use more specific language in divorce decrees. Id. at 809.
379. Id. at 807. Permanent spousal support generally terminates upon remarriage. Id.
380. Id. at 809.
381. Id. at 807. Rehabilitative support is awarded to allow the disadvantaged spouse to seek
education, training, or experience to become self-supporting. Id. An award of rehabilitative spousal
support may be modified if the disadvantaged spouse abandons a good faith effort to become
rehabilitated. Id.; see O'Kelly, Three Concepts of Alimony in North Dakota, I UND FACULTYJ. 69, 77
(1982). It may also be modified upon accomplishment of the rehabilitative goal. 379 N.W.2d at 807
(citing Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1967)).
382. 379 N.W.2d at 809. Before the divorce, Elizabeth assisted Keith in the family business and
acted as a full time mother. Id. After the divorce, she moved to Bismarck and became a licensed real
estate agent. Id.
383. Id. at 808. The divorce decree stated that the alimony was to terminate upon Elizabeth's
death. Id. The court also noted that Elizabeth had received none of the income producing assets of
the marriage. Id.
384. Id. at 809.
385. Id. The court'noted that Elizabeth and Keith did not prepare a property listing at the time
of their divorce. Id. The court suggested that a property listing be prepared for all default divorces to
help the reviewing court to "separate fact from fiction." Id.; see N.D. CT. R. 8.3 (requiring a
property listing to be filed with the clerk of court in a contested divorce).
386. 392 N.W.2d 399 (N.D. 1986).
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father of a child born on the Indian reservation. 8 7 V.G. contended
that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
petition for paternity because the members of Three Affiliated
Tribes had not consented to state court jurisdiction.
3 8
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the United
States Supreme Court recently outlined the proper analysis to be
employed to determine whether federal law preempts the state's
exercise of jurisdiction in claims involving Indians. 389 State court
jirisdiction is precluded if it would undermine "the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them. "390 State courts cannot impermissibly intrude upon tribal
autonomy and self-governance.3 91 The North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that a determination of the parentage of a tribal
member's child is "intimately connected" with matters of tribal
self-governance. 3 9  Thus, the court held that the district court had
erred in exercising jurisdiction over the petition, and therefore,
reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss.
393
INSURANCE
Kiefer v. General Casualty Co.
In Kiefer v. General Casualty Co. 394 General Casualty appealed
the district court's decision that a no-fault insurer must pay its
insured for economic losses even if they previously had been paid
by a separate insurer. 395 On appeal, General Casualty argued that
387. McKenzie County Social Serv. Bd. v. V.G., 392 N.W.2d 399,400 (N.D. 1986).
388. Id. at 400-01. Chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code requires the consent of an
individual Indian or Indian tribe before a state court can exercise jurisdiction in a case between
Indians arising within the boundaries of a reservation. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974 &
Supp. 1985). V.G. alleged that the events and the alleged paternity "arose from" the reservation.
392 N.W.2d at 400.
389. 392 N.W.2d at 401; see Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 2309
(1986).
390. 392 N.W.2d at 401-02 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 147
(1984) decision on remand, 364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2305 (1986)). State court
jurisdiction is also preempted by incompatible federal law. 467 U.S. at 147. The North Dakota
Supreme Court noted that federal law did not preempt chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century
Code, which requires Indians to consent to state court jurisdiction. 392 N.W.2d at 402; see N.D.
CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974 & Supp. 1985).
391. 392 N.W.2d at 401-02 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 148
(1984) decision on remand, 364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2305 (1986)).
392. 392 N.W.2d at 402.
393. Id. The petitioner argued that, because she had received public assistance outside of the
reservation boundaries and because V.G., at times, lived off the reservation, the state court had
jurisdiction. Id. The court stated that these contacts with the state were insufficient to allow the state
to assume jurisdiction. Id.
394. 381 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1986).
395. Kiefer v. General Cas. Co., 381 N.W.2d 205, 206.(N.D. 1986). General Casualty paid
$12,005.53 in no-fault benefits to Kiefer. Id. The remainder of Kiefer's approximately
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no-fault insurance is designed to protect an injured person from
economic loss, and that Kiefer should not be allowed to receive
double recovery. 396 Kiefer argued that his medical expenses were
far in excess of his no-fault coverage and that he was entitled to
payment of the upper limits of the no-fault coverage regardless of
any payments received from separate insurance. 397  Kiefer
contended that the collateral source rule precluded General
Casualty from benefiting from the separate insurance policy.
398
Kiefer also relied on Wallace v. Tri- State Insurance Co., 399 in which
the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that a no-fault insurer
could not defer its payments of benefits because of the existence of
health insurance covering the same losses.
400
The North Dakota Supreme Court distinguished Wallace from
the present case. 40 ' In Wallace the health insurer had not
coordinated its benefits with the no-fault insurer. 40 2 In Kiefer,
however, there was a coordination of benefits between the two
insurers. 40 3 Thus, Wallace was not persuasive precedent. 40 4 The
court also noted that Kiefer's reliance on the collateral source rule
was misplaced.4 0 5 The rule is intended to preclude wrongdoers
from taking advantage of insurance policies and other resources of
people they injure. 40 6 Because the present case involved allocation
of losses for the same accident between separate insurance policies,
$27,000 in medical expenses was paid by Blue Cross. Id. Because Kiefer's medical expenses exceeded
his no-fault limit of $15,000, Kiefer demanded payment of the $2,994.47 balance of his no-fault
limit. Id. General Casualty refused to pay and Kiefer sued. Id.
396. 381 N.W.2d at 206. General Casualty noted that Kiefer had not incurred any economic loss
since Blue Cross had paid the remainder of Kiefer's medical expenses. Id. at 206-07.
397. Id. at 207.
398. Id. The collateral source rule provides that benefits received by the plaintiff from a source
collateral to the wrongdoer do not decrease the damages recoverable from the wrongdoer. See id.
399. 302 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1980).
400. Wallace v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn. 1980). Donald Wallace died
from injuries sustained in a car accident. Id. at 338. The car was insured by Tri-State Insurance
Company. Id. Wallace was also insured under a group health policy by Federated Mutual Insurance
Company. Id. Federated paid substantially all of Wallace's medical expenses. Id. Tri-State then paid
$19,999.10 of basic economic loss under its coverage of the vehicle. Id. Tri-State was not aware of
Federated's payment. Id. When Tri-State learned of Federated's payment, it refused any further
payment. Id. Lawsuits followed. Id. Tri-State argued that, because of Federated's payment, there
were no economic losses and any further payment by Tri-State would result in double recovery. Id.
at 339, The Minnesota Supreme Court, relying ont § 65B.61(l) of the Minnesota Statutes,
determined that the legislature did not intend to allow Tri-State to defer its payment of benefits
because of the existence of other insurance. Id.; see MtNN. STAT. 5 65B.61(l) (1978) (coordination of
automobile insurance benefits).
401. 381 N.W.2d at 207.
402. Id.; see Wallace, 302 N.W.2d at 339.
403. 381 N.W.2d at 206, 207.
404. Id. at 207.
405. Id.
406. Id.; see Keller v. Gama, 378 N.W.2d 867 (N.D. 1985) (interpreting the collateral source
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the policies of the collateral source rule were inapplicable.
40 7
Therefore, the court reversed the district court and held that a no-
fault insurer is not required to duplicate payment of benefits for




In Houser v. Gilber409 three insurance companies appealed the
apportionment of their responsibilities in a wrongful death action
against the Brakkes, their common insureds. 410 While trucking
sugarbeets, the Brakke family deposited mud and dirt on the
highway. 4 1' The jury determined that the Brakkes' negligence was
the sole cause of a head on collision which killed Russell Houser,
the plaintiff's decedent.41 2 The Brakkes were insured by two vehicle
policies, one issued by Tri-State, which covered one truck, and the
other issued by Milbank, which covered the other two trucks.
41 3
They also had a farm liability policy issued by Austin.
4 14
The trial court determined that Tri-State and Milbank were the
primary insurers and that Austin's policy provided coverage on an
excess basis. 41 5 The trial court also limited Milbank's liability to
$100,000 for both vehicles. 41 6 On appeal, Tri-State and Milbank
argued that the vehicle policies did not provide coverage for the
accident and that the trial court's conclusion holding Austin liable
only on an excess basis was erroneous. 417 Austin and Tri-State
argued that Milbank's liability should have been $100,000 for each
of its two insured vehicles. 418
The supreme court concluded that the vehicle policies did
cover the accident. 41 9 The court recognized that the mud could not
have been deposited without the use of trucks and therefore the
necessary causal connection between the use of the vehicles and the
407. 381 N.W.2d at 208.
408. Id.
409. 389 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1986).
410. Houser v. Gilbert, 389 N.W.2d 626, 627 (N.D. 1986).
411. Id.
412. Id. Timothy Gilbert lost control of his semi truck because of the dirt and mud on the
highway. Id. He struck Houser's semi truck head on. Id.
413. Id. at 627-28.
414. Id. at 628.
415. Id. The trial court determined that the accident was caused by the trucks' deposit of mud
and dirt on the highway and by the Brakkes' failure to remove the mud or warn of its existence. Id.
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accident was present. 420 The court also recognized a conflict in
decisions involving the stacking of coverage under a single policy
for several vehicles involved in the same accident. 421 However, the
court found the "Limits of Liability" provision in Milbank's policy
to be unambiguous and determined that it controlled. 422 The
supreme court thus affirmed the lower court's determination
limiting Milbank's liability to $100,000 for both vehicles. 42
3
"The court also concluded that the three insurance companies
must share pro rata in paying the judgment against their common
insureds in the proportion that the separate limits of their respective
coverages bear to the total of the limits of all three policies. 424 The
court noted that the accident involved a vehicle related act of
negligence and a nonvehicle related act of negligence. 425 The court
reasoned that it was not "practical" to apportion the loss between
these concurrent acts, and determined that each insurer's liability
was direct and primary. 426 Thus, the court concluded that all three
insurers were liable on a pro rata basis.
427
MORTGAGES
Poyzer v. Amenia Seed & Grain Co.
In Poyzer v. Amenia Seed & Grain Co. 428 Cargill appealed from a
summary judgment of foreclosure on two real estate mortgages.
42 9
In March of 1981, Cargill and Amenia Seed entered into a security
agreement, attested to by A.W. Poyzer, the general manager of
Amenia Seed, in which Cargill made open account financing
available to Amenia Seed. 430 This agreement was secured by an
420. Id.; see Norgaard v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 871, 874 (N.D. 1972). In Norqaard
the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that in order for the vehicle insurer to be liable, the use of
the vehicle must arise out of the inherent nature of the vehicle. Id.
421. 389 N.W.2d at 629. Compare Inman v. Hartford Ins. Group, 132 Mich. App. 29, 346
N.W.2d 885 (1984) (the limits of liability clause controlled since the policy had no "separability"
clause) with Loerzel v. American Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 204 Misc. 115, 120 N.Y.S.2d 159 (limits of
liability and separability provisions in the policy created an ambiguity allowing court to stack the
coverages), aff'd, 281 A.D. 735, 118 N.Y.S.2d 180(1952).
422. 389 N.W.2d at 629-30. The "Limits of Liability" provision stated, in part, as follows:
"This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of covered persons, claims made, vehicles or
premiums shown in the-Declarations, or vehicles involved in the auto accident." Id. at 629.
423. Id. at 630.
424. Id. at 631.
425. Id.
426. Id. Austin argued that the accident fell within a provision in its policy, which limited its
coverage to excess whenever the loss arose out of the "ownership, maintenance, operation, use,
loading or unloading of any automobile." Id. at 630. Because the use of vehicles was not the sole
cause of the accident, the court determined that the provision was not applicable. Id.
427. Id. at 631.
428. 381 N.W.2d 192 (N.D. 1986).
429. Poyzerv. Amenia Seed & Grain Co., 381 N.W.2d 192, 193 (N.D. 1986).
430. Id.
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unrecorded mortgage on the land under the elevator. 43 1 Amenia
Seed later granted the Poyzers, majority shareholders of Amenia
Seed, two real estate mortgages which were recorded on June 30,
1981.432 The Poyzers commenced foreclosure actions after Amenia
Seed defaulted on the two real estate mortgages. 43 3 The district
court granted the Poyzers' motions for summary judgment of
foreclosure on the grounds that the security agreement between
Cargill and Amenia Seed was not a valid real estate mortgage
under chapter 35-03 of the North Dakota Century Code and,
alternatively, that the Poyzers were bona fide encumbrancers for
value without notice of Cargill's prior unrecorded mortgage. 434
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the
standard real estate mortgage form set forth in section 35-03-05 of
the North Dakota Century Code was not a "mandatory
prerequisite to the creation of a valid mortgage." 435 The Poyzers
argued, however, that the property description contained in
Cargill's security agreement with Amenia Seed was deficient
because it did not describe "specific real property" as required by
section 35-03-01. 1.436 The court disagreed stating the general rule
that a mortgage is void because of an insufficient property
description only if the description is so indefinite that the land
cannot be located. 43 7 Because the land described in the security
agreement could be located, the court determined that the
agreement was not void as a mortgage because of an insufficient
property description. 438 Thus, the court held that the security
agreement was a valid mortgage and remanded the case to
determine whether the Poyzers had actual or constructive notice of
the security agreement.
439
431. Id. at 193-94.
432. Id. at 194, 196.
433. Id. Amenia Seed and Grain Company was declared insolvent in March of 1982. In May
Cargill obtained a $500,000judgment against Amenia Seed in United States District Court. Id. The
Poyzers were not parties to this action. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 195 (citing Northwestern Fed. Say. v. Ternes, 315 N.W.2d 296, 302 (N.D. 1982));
see N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-03-05 (1980) (form of a real estate mortgage).
436. 381 N.W.2d at 195; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-03-01.1 (1980) (definition of a real estate
mortgage). The security agreement between Cargill and Amenia Seed covered property described as
"the land underlying Elevator's facility at Amenia, North Dakota." 381 N.W.2d at 195.
437. 381 N.W.2d at 195; see 9 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE.MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 5 4664, at 54-58.
438. 381 N.W.2d at 196. The court noted that there is only one Amenia Seed and Grain
Company elevator located in Amenia, North Dakota. Id.
439. Id. at 197. The court stated that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding
whether the Poyzers had notice of Cargill's prior unrecorded agreement with Amenia Seed. Id. at
196. A.W. Poyzer had signed the agreement as an attesting witness and was serving as Amenia
Seed's general manager at the time of the agreement. Id.
1987]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Northern Trust Co. v. Buckeye Petroleum Co.
In Northern Trust Co. v. Buckeye Petroleum Co. 440 Northern
extended loans to Buckeye pursuant to a line of credit established
between the two parties. 4 1 The parties executed a security
agreement, an open end mortgage, a financing statement, and an
assignment granting Northern a security interest in certain oil and
gas interests of Buckeye.4 42 The mortgage included a provision for
the assignment to Northern of production and proceeds of
production from the mortgaged property upon written demand by
Northern. 443 In addition, the mortgage included a provision that
allowed Northern to waive in writing its priority in the mortgaged
property. 444 The parties later executed a supplemental open end
mortgage which granted Northern a security interest in Buckeye's
interest in the Johnson well and incorporated by reference all the
terms and conditions of the first open end mortgage. 445 Buckeye
later assigned a partial working interest in the Johnson Well to
Redstone. 446  Buckeye then defaulted on its obligation to
Northern.4 47 While Buckeye was in bankruptcy, Northern sued to
prevent the distribution of the production and proceeds of
production, and to enforce the assignment of production provisions
of the open end mortgage and supplemental open end mortgage.
448
Redstone appealed from a partial summary judgment permitting
Northern to enforce the assignment.
449
On appeal Redstone contended that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment because there were genuine issues of
fact concerning whether Northern waived its priority in the
mortgaged property.4 50 Northern countered that Redstone did not
present evideqce in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment sufficient to establish that Northern had waived in
writing its priority over Redstone. 451 The supreme court concluded
"that Redstone has not adequately raised any factual basis to
440. 389 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1986).
441. Northern Trust Co. v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., 389 N.W.2d 616, 617 (N.D. 1986).
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. The mortgage was recorded and filed as a security agreement and financing statement
in Williams County, North Dakota. Id.
445. Id. The supplemental open end mortgage was recorded in Williams County. Id.
446. Id. Buckeye assigned a working interest in the Johnson Well to Redstone as collateral
securing an unpaid obligation to Redstone. Id. at 617-18.






1987] SUPREME COURT REVIEW 111
establish waiver or to preclude partial summary judgment in
Northern's favor."
452
The supreme court also rejected Redstone's contention that
Northern's sole remedy was to foreclose its mortgage. 453 The court
stated that section 41- 09-47(4) of the North Dakota Century Code
does not prohibit a secured creditor whose security encompasses
both real and personal property from commencing separate actions
against the personal property collateral and the real property
collateral. 454 The court noted that article nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code applies to the production or proceeds of
production of extracted oil and gas because extracted oil and gas is
personal property. 455 The court concluded that when a debtor
defaults, a secured party has article nine rights and remedies in
addition to those provided in the security agreement.45 6 Thus, the
court determined "that Northern was entitled to enforce its
assignment and that Northern did not have to foreclose its
mortgage to enforce that right." 
457
OIL AND GAS
ATantt v. Puckett Energy Co.
In Nanti v. Puckett Energy Co. 458 Puckett Energy Co. (Puckett)
appealed a district court judgment requiring Puckett to pay
$72,000 on drafts given for top leases of the plaintiffs' mineral
rights.459 Each of the plaintiffs, members of the Rockstad family,
granted a top lease, which gave Puckett the right to remove
minerals upon the expiration of prior leases, in return for two
drafts, one payable thirty days after the expiration of the prior
452. Id. at 619. The court noted that Redstone did not submit affidavits or other evidence
,establishing that Northern had waived its priority. Id. Nor did Redstone request additional time in
order to gather such evidence. Id.
453. See id. at 620.
454. Id, (citing State Bank v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760, 764 (N.D. 1981); see N.D. CENT. CODE
41-09-47(4) (1983) (default procedure when security agreement covers both real and personal
property); see Rathert, Use of the Model Form Operation Agreement for the Creation and Enforcement of a
Security Interest, 62 N.D.L. REV. 197, 219-20 (1986) (contending that a secured party may proceed
separately against personal property collateral under the UCC and real property collateral under
state's real property laws).
455. 389 N.W.2d at 620; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-04 (Supp. 1985) (U.C.C. § 9-104)
(extracted oil and gas not excluded from article nine).
456. 389 N.W.2d at 620; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-47(1) (1983) (secured creditor has all
article nine rights plus those contained in security agreement).
457. 389 N.W.2d at 620.
458. 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986). -
459. Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 656 (N.D. 1986). A top lease is "[al lease
granted by a landowner during the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is to become effective
ifand when the existing lease expires or is terminated." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAl OF OIL
AND GAS TERMS 606 (4th ed. 1976).
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leases and one payable forty-five days from sight.4 60 On appeal,
Puckett claimed that payment of the second draft was optional if
Puckett decided to retain an interest in the leased property. 461
Puckett also claimed that the top leases were void because they were
an indefinite suspension of the power of alienation in violation of
the rule against perpetuities.462
The supreme court held that the contemporaneous execution
rule required the top leases and the drafts to be construed
together. 463  When construed together, an ambiguity existed
concerning whether Puckett actually had the option to pay the
second draft.4 64 Thus, the court determined that the trial court's
decision that Puckett was required to pay the draft was not clearly
erroneous. 465 The supreme court also held that the top leases were
not void under the rule against perpetuities. 466 The trial court
determined that Puckett had exercised the option for the top leases
by issuing and delivering the second drafts. 467 Thus, the options




In Serhienko v. Kiker 469 the plaintiffs appealed from a judgment
that dismissed their claim for cancellation of two oil and gas
leases.470 The dispositive issue on appeal was whether the
defendants' testing of a special casing liner on a well which was not
covered by either lease constituted "reworking operations" within
the meaning of a clause contained in each lease providing for the
automatic termination of the lease if the lessees did not commence
reworking operations within sixty days after cessation of oil and gas
production.471
460. 382 N.W.2d at 657.
461. Id. at 657-58.
462. Id. at 658; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-02-27 (1978) (codifying the rule against perpetuities).
463. 382 N.W.2d at 658. Under the contemporaneous execution rule, instruments that relate to
the same transaction and were executed at the same time, are read and construed together. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 659. Because an ambiguity existed between the two drafts, the trial court construed
the agreement in favor of the lessors. Id. at 658.
466. Id. at 662. The court recognized that because oil and gas leases are interests in real
property, they are subject to the rule against perpetuities. Id. at 659-60.
467. Id. at 661.
468. Id. The court noted that if an option to lease was exercisable whenever.the bottom lease
expired, then the rule against perpetuities may be violated because the possibility of indefinite
production under the bottom lease could extend the option for the top lease indefinitely. Id. at 660.
469. 392 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1986).
470. Serhienko v. Kiker, 392 N.W.2d 808, 810 (N.D. 1986).
471. Id. at 812. Production from the Symionow Well, located on land covered by the
defendants' leases, ceased on June 27, 1980. Id. at 840. Production ceased because of casing leaks.
Id. The defendants began testing a special casing liner in October of 1980 on a well in which the
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The supreme court noted that a lessee's intent to commence
reworking operations must be unqualified and not dependent upon
the happening of certain contingencies. 472 The court stated that the
defendants' preliminary testing of a special casing liner on another
well did not amount to a bona fide effort to restore the leased well to
production. 473 Because the continued operation of wells located on
the leased property was contingent on the results of the defendants'
tests, the court concluded that the defendants had not diligently
commenced reworking operations within the meaning of the sixty
day provision of the leases. 474 Therefore, the court concluded that
the district court erred, as a matter of law, in determining that
reworking operations on the leased well were commenced within




In State v. Patze7476 the defendants, parents who refused to send
their children to school, appealed their convictions for violating
North Dakota's compulsory school attendance laws. 477 Each of the
defendants attempted to educate their children at home. 478 None,
however, were certified teachers, nor were the children taught by
certified teachers in their homes.47 9 The defendants asserted that
their convictions should be reversed because the compulsory school
attendance laws unconstitutionally infringed upon their religious
beliefs. 480 The issue on appeal was whether parents, because of
plaintiffs had no interest. Id. The defendants did not return to the Symionow Well until March of
1981, seven and one-half months after they had ceased production. Id. at 816.
472. Id. at 813. The court noted that an exact definition of"reworking operations" was difficult
to formulate. Id. at 812. The court looked at decisions from other courts to establish guidelines. Id. at
812-13; see jardell v. Hillin Oil Co., 485 So. 2d 919, 925 (La. 1986) (lessees must make good faith
effort); Lone Star Producing Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496, 500 (Miss. 1971) (lessee must make a
bona fide effort to rework the well); True Oil Co. v. Gibson, 392 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Wyo. 1964)
(lessee's intent to continue reworking operations must not depend upon contingencies).
473. 392 N.W.2d at 814.
474. Id. The court noted that, although the defendants' actions may have been prudent from an.
economic standpoint, the "prudent operator" standard is inapplicable to operations necessary to
keep a lease in effect. Id. (citing 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 5 808, at 57 (1985)).
475. 392 N.W.2d at 814.
476. 382 N.W.2d 631 (N.D. 1986).
477. State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631, 633 (N.D. 1986); seeN.D. CENT. COnE ch. 15-34.1 (1981
& Supp. 1985) (compulsory school attendance).
478. 382 N.W.2d at 633.
479. Id.
480. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing the free exercise of religious beliefs). The
defendants testified that God had given them the sole responsibility to educate their children. 382
N.W.2d at 633. They believed that if their children attended school at an early age, they would
become "peer socialized" and be precluded from accepting their parents' religious values. Id. The
defendants stated that when their children were sufficiently mature they could be educated outside
the home. Id.
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religious beliefs, have the right to educate their children at home
without complying with the law requiring teachers to be
certified .481
The North Dakota Supreme Court applied a three prong
test.4 82 The first prong was whether the parents' decision was
motivated by a "legitimate and sincerely held religious belief."
'4 8 3
The court assumed that it was. 484 The second prong was whether
the compulsory attendance statutes burdened the parents' free
exercise of their religious beliefs. 48 5 The court determined that,
because the parents' religious beliefs dictated home schooling, the
certification requirement did impose an indirect burden.4 8 6 Thus,
the court applied the third prong, a balancing test, and evaluated
the state's compelling interest in teacher regulation against the
parents' interest in the free exercise of their religion. 487 The court
determined that the certification requirement was reasonably
narrow and the least restrictive means of satisfying the state's
compelling interest in education. 488 Therefore, the court affirmed
the parents' convictions.
48 9
In re C. S.
In In re C. S. 490 C.S. and A.S. and their parents appealed from
a juvenile court order finding each child to be an "unruly child"
because of habitual truancy.4 91 C.S. and A.S. were absent from
public school at the express direction of their parents. 492 The issue
on appeal was whether C.S. and A.S. may be considered unruly
481. 382 N.W.2d at 634.
482. Id.; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (stating a three prong test to use when
determining whether the free exercise clause of the first amendment is infringed upon by a state
regulation).
483. 382 N.W.2d at 634.
484. Id. at 635. Counsel for the State conceded that the parents were motivated by sincerely held
religious beliefs. Id.
485. Id. at 634.
486. Id. at 635-36. The court noted that the parents did not have, and could not obtain, the
necessary educational requirements for certification without experiencing substantial hardship. Id. at
635.
487. Id. at 636-37.
488. Id. at 636-39. The court noted that, while an educational equivalency standard for home
instructors might be less restrictive than a certification requirement, the equivalency standard would
undoubtedly be challenged for vagueness. Id. at 639.
489. Id.
490. 382 N.W.2d 381 (N.D. 1986).
491. InreC.S., 382 N.W.2d 381,382 (N.D. 1986).
492. Id. C.S. and A.S.'s parents removed their children from the public school because they
believed that their children's educational abilities were not being fully realized. Id. The parents also
preferred that their children be educated with Christian oriented materials. Id. After the parents
removed their children from the public school, they taught them at home. Id. Neither of the parents
were certified teachers. Id.
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because their parents refused to allow them to attend public
school.4
9 1
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that subsection 27-
20-02(10) of the North Dakota Century Code, which defines
"unruly child," focuses only upon the child's conduct.494 The
court noted that the subsection does not deal with the parent's
conduct. 495 The court determined that absence from school because
of parental conduct is addressed by subsection 27-20-02(5)(a), the
deprivation provision of the North Dakota Century Code. 496 A
child may be found to be unruly based on habitual truancy only if
he or she is absent from school in defiance of parental authority.
497
Therefore, because C.S. and A.S. were absent from school at their
parents' direction, the court concluded that they were not unruly




In Loken v. Magrum499 Ardell Loken appealed from a summary
judgment dismissing with prejudice his complaint against A. C.
Transport, Ltd. and Lloyd C. Magrum because Loken's claim was
barred by the statute of limitations. 500 A. C. Transport, Ltd. and
Lloyd Magrum were nonresidents of North Dakota.50 1 On appeal,
Loken argued that section 28-01-32 of the North Dakota Century
Code, which tolls the statute of limitations when a potential
defendant is absent from the state, applies to both residents of
North Dakota and nonresidents.5 0 2 A. C. Transport and Magrum
contended that section 28-01-32 applies only to residents of North
Dakota who leave the state and establish a domicile elsewhere.
503
493. Id. at 383.
494. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(10) (Supp. 1985) (defining an unruly child). The
court noted that chapter 27-20 of the North Dakota Century Code is derived from the Uniform
Juvenile Court Act. 382 N.W.2d at 384. The court examined the Commissioners' Notes to the
Uniform Act to determine that the unruly child provision focuses only upon the child's conduct. Id.;
see UNIF. TUVENILE'COURT ACT § 2 commissioners' note, 9A U.L.A. 8(1979).
495. 382 N.W.2d at 383-84. The court noted that the parents had violated § 15-34.1-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code by ordering their children not to attend the public school. Id. at 385; see
N. D. CENT. CODE 5 15-34.1-01 (Supp. 1985) (compulsory school attendance statute).
496. 382 N.W.2d at 384; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(5)(a) (Supp. 1985) (defining a
deprived child).
497. 382 N.W.2d at 384.
498. Id. at 386.
499. 380 N.W.2d 336 (N.D. 1986).
500. Loken v. Magrum, 380 N.W.2d 336,337 (N.D. 1986).
501. Id.
502. Id. at 338; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-32 (Supp. 1985).
503. 380 N.W.2d at 338. Magrum and A. C. Transport also argued that if S 28-01-32 applied to
a nonresident, the statute of limitations would be meaningless to nonresident defendants who:
commit torts within North Dakota. Id.
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The supreme court noted that section 28-01-32 was derived
from, and is substantially identical to, a New York
statute. 50 4 Accordingly, the court examined New York cases from
which it determined that the New York statute applies to both
residents and nonresidents.5 0 5 The court found these cases
persuasive and concluded that section 28-01-32 was applicable to
residents of North Dakota and nonresidents.
50 6
Magrum and A.C. Transport also argued that section 28-01-
32 was suspended because substituted service of process on them
was available pursuant to sections 39-01-11 and 39-01-12 of the
North Dakota Century Code. 50 7 The court noted, however, that
the legislature had not expressly provided for an exception to the
tolling of section 28-01-32.508 The court stated that if there was to
be such an exception, the legislature was the appropriate body to
adopt it. 5°9 The court concluded that the district court had erred in
granting summary judgment and, therefore, reversed and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
510
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lang v. Bank of North Dakota
In Lang v. Bank of North Dakota511 Lang appealed more than ten
months after the entry of the final order denying his motion to
enjoin the foreclosure of a farm by advertisement.5 1 2 The Bank of
North Dakota (Bank) moved to dismiss Lang's appeal because it*.
was not filed within the time limits of rule 4(a) of the North Dakota
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 51 3 The supreme court noted that
under rule 4(a) the time for appeal does not begin to run until the
notice of entry of the order appealed from is served. 51 4 However,
the court recognized that even if the record does not reflect service
of a notice of entry, actual knowledge of entry of an order begins
504. Id. at 338-39. Compare N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW S 207 (McKinney 1972) (statute of limitations
tolls while defendant is absent from state) with N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-32 (Supp. 1985) (if
defendant leaves state statute oflimitations is tolled).
505. 386 N.W.2d at 339-40; see, e.g., Ruggles v. Keeler, 3Johns, 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
506. 380 N.W.2d at 340-41.
507. Id. at 341; see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-01-11 to -12 (1980) (providing for substituted service
of process on a nonresident motorist).
508. 380 N.W.2d at 341.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 342.
511. 377 N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1985).
512. Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 377 N.W.2d 575, 576 (N.D. 1985).
513. Id. at 577; see N.D.R. App. P. 4(a) (notice of appeal must be filed "within 60 days of date of
service of notice of entry of thejudgment or order appealed from"). The district court denied Lang's
motion to enloin the foreclosure on May 11, 1984. 377 N.W.2d at 577. Lang did not file his notice of
appeal until March 27, 1985. Id.
514. 377 N.W.2d at 577.
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the running of the time for appeal when the actual knowledge is
clearly evidenced in the record. 515 The court concluded that,
because Lang had actual knowledge of the entry of judgment for
over nine months before he filed his notice of appeal, Lang's appeal
was untimely.
51 6
Lang argued, however, that his appeal should not be dismissed
because section 28-29-04 of the North Dakota Century Code
authorizes the court to "extend the time for serving and filing all
papers requisite and necessary for the final determination of any
cause."15 17 The court recognized that the legislative policy of
judicial forbearance during agricultural depressions is strongly
rooted in North Dakota's history. 51 8 The court also stated,
however, that if a timely appeal is not filed, a lower court's decision
is final and should be modified only in rare circumstances and for
compelling policy reasons. 519 The court determined that Lang's
"misguided" pro se effort did not compel the choice of forbearance
over finality. 520 Therefore, the court granted the Bank's motion to
dismiss Lang's appeal.
521
Solen Public School District No. 3 v. Heisler
In Solen Public School District No. 3 v. Heisler5 22 Solen appealed a
district court judgment which had affirmed a decision made by the
Combined Committee of Sioux and Morton Counties (Committee)
that authorized parents of certain children living within the Solen
school district to send their children to Flasher schools with Solen
paying tuition. 523 Section 15-40.2- 05 of the North Dakota Century
Code permits a parent to petition their school board to pay for their
child's tuition in another school district. 524 If the board denies the
petition, the parent may appeal the decision to a three member
515. Id. at 578 (citing Kfaudt v. Klaudt, 156 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1968)).
516. Id. The court concluded that Lang had actual knowledge of entry of the order on June 11,
1984, when Lang filed an application for a writ of mandamus asking the North Dakota Supreme
Court to compel the district court to enjoin the foreclosure sale. Id.
517. Id. at 578-79; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974) (authorizing courts to extend time for
serving and filing papers when farm prices are confiscatory).
518. 377 N.W.2d at 579.
519. Id.; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 60(b) (court may grant relief from judgment due to mistake or
inadvertence).
520. 377 N.W.2d at 580.
521. Id. The court stated that it was not ruling out the applicability of S 28-29-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code to appellate procedure. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-29-04 (1974)
(confiscatory price defense). The court determined only that the facts of this case did not warrant
extending the time for Lang to have filed his notice of appeal. Id.
522. 381 N.W.2d 201 (N.D. 1986).
523. Solen Pub. School Dist. No. 3 v. Heisler, 381 N.W.2d 201, 202 (N.D. 1986).
524. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 15-40.2-05 (Supp. 1985) (application for payment of tuition by
district).
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committee. 525 In the present case, Solen denied the parents'
petitions, and on September 10, 1984, the parents appealed Solen's
decision to the Committee. 526 The Committee met on September
18, 1984 but was unable to reach a decision. 527 The Committee
agreed to reconvene on October 2, 1984.528 On October 2, 1984 the
Committee granted the parents' petitions.
5 29
On appeal, Solen contended that the Committee did not have
jurisdiction to render a decision because more than fifteen days had
elapsed since the filing of the appeal.530 Section 15-40.2-05 of the
North Dakota Century Code states that the Committee "shall"
render its decision within fifteen days of the filing of the appeal.
5 31
In this case, twenty-two days had passed between the appeal and
the Committee's decision.5 32 The North Dakota Supreme Court
noted that the word "shall" in statutes ordinarily creates a
mandatory duty and the word "may" creates a directory duty. 533 A
court, however, may look at the legislative intent and determine
that the word "shall" is to be construed as "may. ' 534 The court
also noted that statutes concerning a public officer's duty to
perform within a specified time are generally construed as
directory, with the purpose of ensuring that private and public
interests are not harmed by delay. 
535
The court then balanced all the interests involved to determine
whether any prejudice caused by the delay was outweighed by the
public's interest in allowing the act to be performed after the
statutory time period had elapsed.5 36 The court stated that the
legislature intended the fifteen day time period to provide order
and promptness in the proceedings but did not intend for
noncompliance to invalidate subsequent proceedings, unless an
interested party was prejudiced by the noncompliance.5 37 The court
did not believe that Solen had been prejudiced and, therefore,
determined that the Committee did have jurisdiction to render its
decision. 538 The district court'sjudgment was affirmed.
539
525. Id.
526. 381 N.W.2d at 202.




531. N.D. CENT. CODE S 15-40.2-05 (Supp. 1985).
532. 381 N.W.2d at 202-03.
533. Id. at 203.
534. Id. (citing In re Nyflot, 340 N.W.2d 178 (N.D. 1983)).
535. Id. at 204,
536. Id. (citing Vann v. District of Columbia Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 441 A.2d'
246, 246 (D.C. 1982)).
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id. Solen also argued that its due process rights were violated because it had not been given
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State v. Miller
In State v. Miller5 40 the State appealed from a trial court's
decision to suppress evidence as a discovery sanction. 541 The issue
before the supreme court was whether subsection 29-28-07(5) of the
North Dakota Century Code limits appeals by the State in criminal
actions to issues arising from pretrial motions to suppress.5 42 The
State contended that subsection 29-28-07(5) on its face permits
appeals of "[a]n order. . . suppressing evidence. . . ,,543 The
supreme court, however, determined that subsection 29-28-07(5)
relates to a trial court's decision to grant a motion to suppress
evidence pursuant to rule 12 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 544 The court reasoned that, because rule 12 requires a
defendant tor move to suppress evidence and the judge to rule on the
motion at a pretrial stage, appeals pursuant to subsection 29-28-
07(5) are limited to issues arising at a pretrial stage. 545 Therefore,
the supreme court dismissed the appeal because it was from an
exclusion of evidence pursuant to a discovery sanction.
546
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Olson v. Job Service North Dakota
In Olson v. Job Service North Dakota547 Olson appealed from an
order that affirmed Job Service's decision disqualifying Olson from
sufficient notice of the October 2, 1984 meeting. Id. Solen, however, never argued that it was
unaware of the October 2 meeting. Id. at 205 n.2. Additionally, Solen admitted that it did not
participate in the meeting only because it believed the Committee had no jurisdiction. Id. at 204-05.
Thus, the supreme court determined that Solen had been given sufficient notice of the meeting and
its due process rights were not violated. Id. at 205.
540. 391 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 1986).
541. State v. Miller, 391 N.W.2d 151, 151 (N.D. 1986). The state's attorney was under a
continuing duty to notify the defense counsel of any newly discovered evidence. Id. The state's
attorney waited until the day of the defendant's trial to check the evidence for fingerprints. Id. That
day, the state's attorney requested permission to add to his witness list the names of the officers who
conducted the fingerprint test. Id. The trial court suppressed the evidence because of the State's lack
of due diligence. Id. at 152; see N.D.R. CRIM. P. 16(g) (penalties for failure to comply with
continuing duty to disclose).
542. 391 N.W.2d at 152; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-28-07(5) (Supp. 1985) (,he State may
appeal from an order suppressing evidence).
543. 391 N.W.2d at 152; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(5) (Supp. 1985). The supreme court
stated that it was possible to construe "suppressing" as a generic term meaning any form of
exclusion of evidence. 391 N.W.2d at 152. However, the court chose to interpret the language in
terms of its common usage - "a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to [rule 12 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure]." Id.; see N.D.R. CRIM. P. 12 (motion to suppress evidence is
a pretrial motion).
544. 391 N.W.2d at 152. The court reasoned that without relating 5 29-28-07(5) to rule 12, the
State would be allowed to appeal any exclusion of evidence. Id. The court feared that such a
construction would increase appeals, and create double jeopardy and fair trial concerns. Id. at 152-
53.
545. See391 N.W.2d at 153.
546. Id. at 155.
547. 379 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1985).
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receiving unemployment benefits. 548 Olson was fired because of her
consumption of alcohol while off-duty. 54 9 Olson filed a claim for
unemployment benefits but was disqualified because she had been
discharged for misconduct. 550 The issue on appeal was whether Job
Service was justified in disqualifying Olson from receiving benefits
because of her conduct during off-duty hours.551
The supreme court noted that "misconduct" is defined as
"conduct by the employee which results in harming the employer's
interests.' '552 The court determined that Olson's off-duty conduct
was not a threat to her employer's business interests. 553 Because the
court could not find a reasonable relationship between Olson's off-
duty conduct and her employer's interests, the court concluded as a
matter of law that Olson's conduct did not constitute
misconduct. 554  Therefore, the court reversed the decision and
remanded the case to Job Service for a decision consistent with the
court's opinion.
555
548. Olson v. Job Serv. North Dakota, 379 N.W.2d 285, 286 (N.D. 1985).
549. Id. Olson's employer contended that, "at the time of hiring, Olson agreed to refrain from
the consumption of alcohol, both on and off the job." Id. Olson stated that she did not recall this
alleged agreement. Id.
550. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 52-06-02(2) (Supp. 1985) (a worker is disqualified from
receiving benefits if discharged for misconduct). Job Service initially disqualified Olson from
receiving benefits. 379 N.W.2d at 286. Olson appealed this determination. Id. After an
administrative hearing, an appeals referee granted Olson benefits. Id. The employer appealed the
appeals referee's decision to the Job Service Bureau, which reversed the referee's decision and
disqualified Olson from receiving benefits because of her midconduct. Id.
551. 379 N.W.2d at 287. The notice of appeal stated that it was from an "order," not from a
judgment as required by § 28-32-21 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-32-21 (Supp. 1985) (statutory authorization for an appeal from a district court judgment
concerning an administrative decision). The court determined that, in the interests of justice, it
would consider the appeal properly before the court and review it on its merits. 379 N.W.2d at 287.
552. 379 N.W.2d at 287-88; see Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, -, 296 N.W.
636, 640 (1941). The North Dakota Supreme Court has adopted the definition of "misconduct" as
articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Boynton. See Perske v. Job Serv. North Dakota, 336
N.W.2d 146, 148-49 (N.D. 1983).
553. 379 N.W.2d at 289. The court distinguished the present case from a Wisconsin case which
determined that an employee's off-duty consumption of alcohol was misconduct justifying the denial
of unemployment benefits. Id.; seeGregory v. Anderson, 14 Wis. 2d 130, 109 N.W.2d 675 (1961). In
Gregory the employee's job required driving a delivery truck to taverns, and the employer was
required to maintain insurance coverage on the truck. Id. at __, 109 N.W.2d at 677. Because
insurance was difficult to obtain, the employer required the employee to agree not to consume
alcoholic beverages while on or off duty. Id. at __, 109 N.W.2d at 677-78. The court determined
that the employee's violation of this agreement was reasonably related to the employer's interests and
accordingly constituted misconduct. Id. at -, 109 N.W.2d at 681. The North Dakota Supreme
Court stated, however, that Olson's off-duty consumption of alcohol was not threatening to her
employer's interests. 379 N.W.2d at 288. Therefore, Gregory was not persuasive authority. Id.
554. 379 N.W.2d at 288. Justice VandeWalle dissented from the majority's determination that
Olson's behavior was not misconduct. Id. at 288-89 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice VandeWalle stated that the supreme court's function was to determine
only whether "a reasoning mind could reasonably have concluded that an oral agreement between
Olson and [the employer] did exist and that Olson's violation of that agreement caused her
termination." Id. at 288. .Justice VandeWalle concluded that the evidence supported Job Service's
determination that Olson's violation of the agreement constituted misconduct. Id. at 289. Therefore,
Justice VandeWalle would have affirmed the judgment affirmingJob Service's determination. Id.
555. Id. at 288.
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Carlson v. Job Service North Dakota
In Carlson v. Job Service North Dakota556 Barbara Carlson sought
unemployment compensation claiming that she quit her job only
because she was about to be discharged. 557 Job Service had denied
Carlson benefits, stating that Carlson had left her job voluntarily
"without good cause attributable to [her] employer. ' 558 Job
Service noted that she could have worked five more weeks until her
discharge was final. 559 The district court affirmed Job Service's
denial of benefits and Carlson appealed.
560
On appeal, Carlson argued that, since she quit only because of
her imminent discharge, she did not leave "voluntarily" and was
therefore entitled to unemployment compensation. 561 The North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that just because Carlson could have
worked until final discharge did not mean that she quit
voluntarily. 562 Noting that only serious misconduct bars an
employee from unemployment benefits, the court reversed the
district court's determination and held that an employee who
resigns in the face of certain discharge may receive unemployment
compensation. 563 However, the court stated that compensation
should date from the time discharge would have occurred, not from




Great American Insurance Co. v. American State Bank
In Great American Insurance Co. v. American State Bank565
American State Bank appealed from a judgment in favor of Great
American Insurance for conversion of a "payable through"
draft. 566 Great American Insurance issued a "payable through"
556. 391 N.W.2d 643 (N.D. 1986).
557. Carlson v. Job Serv. North Dakota, 391 N.W.2d 643, 644 (N.D. 1986).
558. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 52-06-02(1) (Supp. 1985) (listing conditions that disqualify a
claimant from receiving unemployment compensation benefits).
559. 391 N.W.2d at 644. Mrs. Carlson quit her job after discovering a note on her supervisor's
desk stating that her removal was to begin immediately. Id. at 644-45.
560. Id. at 644.
561. Id. at 645. Courts are split on the question of whether resignation after notice of
termination, but before the effective date of termination, is "voluntary." Id. Compare Johnston v.
Florida Dept. of Commerce, 340 So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (resigning before the
effective discharge date is not voluntary) with Ferguson v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec., 594 P.2d
544, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (resigning prior to the effective discharge date is voluntary).
562. 391 N.W.2d at 646.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 646-47.
565. 385 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1986).
566. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. American State Bank, 385 N.W.2d 460, 461 (N.D. 1986); see N.D.
CENT. CODE S 41-03-20 (1983) (definition of a "payable through" draft).
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draft to the order of Welch Rathole Service and Ford Motor Credit
Company.5 67 Welch endorsed the draft and deposited it in its
account at American State Bank without Ford Motor Credit's
endorsement.5 68  Great American Insurance, as Ford Motor
Credit's assignee, commenced a conversion action against
American State Bank, and the district court granted judgment
against American State Bank.
5 69
On appeal, American State Bank argued that the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) displaces the common law with regard to
conversion of negotiable instruments and, that under the UCC, its
failure to obtain the copayee's endorsement did not constitute
conversion.5 70  The supreme court disagreed, stating that the
general principles of common-law conversion supplement the
UCC. 571 The court determined that payment of a negotiable
instrument with a missing endorsement constitutes conversion.
5 7
1
American State Bank also argued that it was discharged from
liability for conversion because Great American Insurance had not
made a claim for breach of presentment warranty within a
reasonable time after learning of the breach. 573 American State
Bank contended that Great American Insurance learned of the
breach when it approved the draft for payment. 574 The court noted
that in the usual check collection case involving a drawer customer
and a drawee bank, the bank is not generally obligated to discover
missing endorsements. 575 However, since the drawer and the
drawee are the same entity for a "payable through" draft, the court
imposed an obligation on the drawer-drawee, Great American
Insurance, to check for missing endorsements. 576 Therefore, the
court determined that Great American Insurance learned of the
567. 385 N.W.2d at 461. Great American Insurance insured a truck owned by Welch Rathole
Service and financed by Ford Motor Credit Company. Id. After the truck was involved in an
accident, Great American Insurance issued a $13,000 "payable through" draft to Welch and Ford
Motor Credit. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 461-62.
570. Id. at 462. Section 41-03-56(1) of the North Dakota Century Code refers only to forged
endorsements, not missing endorsements, in defining conversion. See N.D. CENT. CoDE S 41-03-
56(1) (1983).
571. 385 N.W.2d at 462; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-03 (1983) (legal principles supplement
UCC).
572. 385 N.W.2d at 462.
573. Id. at 463-65; see N.D. CENT. Coo § 41-04-17(4) (1983) (breach of warranty claim must be
brought within reasonable time).
574. 385 N.W.2d at 465.
575. Id. (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 303 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Fla.
1969); aff'd, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970)).
576. Id. at 465-66. The court noted that in the usual check collection case, the drawer customer
has the duty to check his or her banking statement for alterations or missing endorsements. Id. at




breach when it approved the draft for payment.5 77 Accordingly, the
court reversed the judgment finding American State Bank liable for
conversion and remanded to determine whether Great American
Insurance had made a claim for breach of warranty within a
reasonable time after learning of the breach.
578
WORKER'S COMPENSATION
Blaskowski v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
In Blaskowski v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
579
the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau (Bureau)
appealed from a judgment reversing the Bureau's order to suspend
all future benefits to the claimant, Diane Blaskowski, until the
Bureau was subrogated to the extent of fifty percent of Blaskowski's
settlement with a third party.580 The issue on appeal was whether
section 65-01-09 of the North Dakota Century Code grants the
Bureau the authority to suspend a claimant's future benefits when
the Bureau has already been compensated for past benefits. 581 The
North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the
Bureau's subrogation right is to reimburse the workmen's
compensation fund at the expense of the person at fault. 582 The
court concluded that prohibiting the Bureau from suspending
future benefits would hinder the Bureau's efforts to enforce its right
of subrogation. 583 The court therefore reversed the judgment and
affirmed the Bureau's order suspending future benefits.
58 4
State ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Bureau v. Clary
In State ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Bureau v. Clary585 Clary
appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the North Dakota
577. 385 N.W.2d at 466.
578. Id.
579. 380 N.W.2d 333 (N.D. 1986).
580. Blaskowski v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 380 N.W.2d 333, 333
(N. D. 1986). Blaskowski was injured while working at Walt Sanders Chevrolet. Id. As a result of her
injuries, Blaskowski filed a worker's compensation claim and received $9,669.53 in benefits. Id. at
334. She then sued a third party for damages sustained because of the injury and received a $35,000
settlement. Id.
581. Id. at 335; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-09 (1985).
582. 380 N.W.2d at 335 (citingGernand v. Ost Serv., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500, 505 (N.D. 1980)).
583. Id. at 336. The court noted that, in 1965, the North Dakota Legislature reduced the
Bureau's subrogation right to third party recoveries from one hundred percent to fifty percent. Id. at
335; see Act approved Mar. 8, 1965, ch. 452, 1965 N.D. Laws 932. The court stated that the Bureau
responded to this reduction by adopting policies to protect the remainder of its subrogation interest.
380 N.W.2d at 335.
584. 380 N.W.2d at 336. Blaskowski's future benefits were suspended until the future benefits
equaled or exceeded $5,012.95. Id. at 334.
585. 389 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1986).
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Workmen's Compensation Bureau (Bureau).58 6 Clary had received
benefits from the Bureau as compensation for work related
injuries. 58 7 He then brought a negligence action against a third
party for damages resulting from his work related injuries. 58 8 The
jury determined that Clary had sustained damages in the amount
of $120,000, that the third party was negligent, and that Clary was
twenty-five percent contributorily negligent. 58 9 As a result of the
apportioned negligence, Clary recovered $97,667, $120,000 less
Clary's twenty-five percent negligence. 590 The Bureau contended
that its subrogation interest under section 65-01-09 of the North
Dakota Century Code of Clary's third party recovery was
$48,833.50, fifty percent of the total damages recovered by
Clary. 591 Clary contended that his twenty-five percent contributory
negligence should be used to reduce the Bureau's subrogation
interest by twenty-five percent. 592 The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the Bureau and Clary appealed.
5 93
On appeal Clary argued that section 65-01-09 was impliedly
amended by the adoption of section 9-10-07, North Dakota's
comparative negligence statute. 594 The North Dakota Supreme
Court, however, noted that the Workmen's Compensation Act
(Act) is a distinct body of law separate from common law and
statutory tort provisions.5 95 The court stated that there was no
indication that the legislature had intended to amend the Act when





590. Id. at 348.
591. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (1985). Section 65-01-09 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The fund shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured employee or his dependents to
the extent of fifty percent of the damages recovered up to a maximum of the total
amount it has paid or would otherwise pay in the future in compensation and benefits
for the injured employee. The bureau's subrogation interest may not be reduced by
settlement, compromise, or judgment.
Id.
592. 389 N.W.2d at 348.
593. Id.
594. Id. at 349; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975) (comparative negligence). The court
noted that the comparative negligence statute was enacted to eliminate the inequitable result of
denying a plaintiff recovery if he or she was contributorily negligent by as little as one percent. 389
N.W.2d at 349. Pursuant to § 9-10-07, a plaintiff is allowed to recover if his or her negligence is "not
as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-
07(1975).
595. 389 N.W.2d at 350. The court noted that the Workmen's Compensation Act is
"independent of, and a substitute for, other forms of relief for injury and death to an employee." Id.;
see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01, -08, 65-04-28, 65-05-06 (1985).
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it adopted the comparative negligence statute. 596 The court,
therefore, concluded that section 9-10-07 did not impliedly amend
section 65-01-09.597
Clary also argued that equitable principles should govern the
Bureau's subrogation rights and that, since his recovery had been
reduced by the amount of his negligence, the Bureau's right to
recover from him should be reduced by the same amount. 598 The
court noted, however, that the Bureau's subrogation rights are
statutory and that equitable principles are, therefore,
inapplicable. 599 The court noted that section 65-01-09 expressly
states that the Bureau's subrogation interest extends to fifty percent
of the damages recovered from the third party.6 0 0 The court
accordingly affirmed the judgment.
601
596. 389 N.W.2d at 350.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 350-51.
599. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-01-06 (1975) ("there is no common law in any case where the
law is declared by the code").
600. 389 N.W.2d at 351; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-09 (1985).
601. 389 N.W.2d at 351.
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